Massenbach-Letter. NEWS 13.04.18

Massenbach-Letter. News

  • The National Interest: Striking Syria Again Would Be a Grave Mistake for America (and President Trump).
  • Nord-West Zeitung (Oldenburg) – Kommentar – Zum Syrischen Bürgerkrieg : Hilfloser Westen.
  • Geopolitical Intelligence Service – Turkey, Iran and the potential for peace in Syria.
  • David Schenker Nominated to Be Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs.
  • Why the Marshall Plan Worked — and Why It Won’t in Today’s Warzones.
  • Japan activates first marines since WW2 to bolster defenses against China.
  • Still a topic: Blick-durch-die-Wirtschaft, Frankfurt, 18 Jan 1981:„Wie anders sind die Moslems? Araber in einer fremden Gedankenwelt.

Nur der Abbau von Clichévorstellungen öffnet den Zugang zu andersdenkenden Partnern.“

  • Strategic Stabilization: A Window of Opportunities for Russia and the U.S.
  • Four Years of EU–Ukraine Association: Teething Problems or Permanent Crisis?
  • Caucasian Knot. NEWS.

Massenbach*Defense One: “Why the Marshall Plan Worked — and Why It Won’t in Today’s Warzones”.

By Benn Steil Director of International Economics, Council on Foreign Relations

“…A host of similar-sounding yet unworkable aid schemes are among the legacies of the one that launched 70 years ago Tuesday. The common underlying belief in all these cases is that financial aid can bring harmony, political stability, and prosperity. But this is to misunderstand the Marshall Plan and the circumstances that made it work…. On the surface, at least, it worked. Output increased by 60 percent over the period, and the Communists were marginalized. It is important to recognize, however, that financial aid did not achieve this on its own…., it is critical to recognize that physical security is prerequisite for economic revival.”

The Marshall Plan—the mammoth aid scheme to revive western Europe after World War II—celebrates its 70th anniversary on April 3.

And perhaps its most enduring legacy is the endless desire to repeat it.

“On May 10, 1948, the John H. Quick brought 8,800 tons of wheat to the port of Bordeaux, the first shipboard aid to France under the Marshall Plan.”

In recent years, there have been a striking number of impassioned calls from western statesmen and celebrity philanthropists for new “Marshall Plans” around the globe: Hillary Clinton for the Arab Middle East, former German finance minister Peer Steinbrueck in southern Europe; George Soros for Ukraine; and most recently Sen. Chris Murphy for Syria. Al Gore wants one for the environment. The list goes on. As German economist Werner Abelshauser observed, “There is hardly a crisis anywhere in the world which in the view of the West ought not be solved by a sort of Marshall Plan.”

The common underlying belief in all these cases is that financial aid can bring harmony, political stability, and prosperity. But this is to misunderstand the Marshall Plan and the circumstances that made it work.

The Marshall Plan — formally, the European Recovery Program — was the first major policy component of U.S. diplomat George Kennan’s new strategy of “containing” the Soviet Union, which he outlined in an important Foreign Affairs article in 1947. The aid tendered, as a percentage of U.S. output, would be equivalent to about $800 billion today. The idea was to hasten the recovery in West European output, thereby bolstering each nation’s ability to resist Soviet subversion and the temptations of local Communist parties—which were particularly powerful in Italy and France. The Truman administration believed such a recovery would allow the United States to protect its vital political and economic interests in Europe without having to maintain millions of troops there. “The greatest danger to the security of the United States,” warned the new Central Intelligence Agency, “is the possibility of economic collapse in western Europe and the consequent accession to power of communist elements.”

The aid was to be spread over four years. This was meant to convince the recipients that the United States would not, after disbursing the funds, retreat into isolation as it had after World War I. It was also to be premised on a program, to be devised in Europe itself, for economic integration, in order to ensure that resources were used most efficiently. The State Department’s Will Clayton believed passionately that western Europe needed to look more like the United States if it wished to maximize its living standards and maintain popular support for free enterprise.

On the surface, at least, it worked. Output increased by 60 percent over the period, and the Communists were marginalized. It is important to recognize, however, that financial aid did not achieve this on its own.

The United States has spent more than $200 billion on reconstruction in Afghanistan and Iraq—or over 50 percent more than the totality of Marshall aid, in current dollars. Yet it has precious little to show for it, economically or politically. The most important reason is a lack of security. Neither country has ever achieved full control of its territory. Instead, both have been under constant siege from armed domestic and foreign opponents, such as the Taliban and ISIS. Their governments have also not been, unlike Marshall governments, natural allies of the United States, which has in turn been at odds with alternative neighboring benefactors such as Iran.

The Marshall Plan, too, would not have worked without security. In fact, the French and the British were adamant that they could not carry out the State Department’s integration vision without security guarantees from the United States. Integration meant sacrificing self-sufficiency. Being dependent on, say, coal from western Germany meant the possibility that a future Germany—perhaps under Soviet control—could throttle its economies by cutting off supply. This in turn meant an intolerable national security risk. Businesses would not invest and the economy would not recover under such a threat. They therefore persuaded the Truman administration to add, in April 1949, what the latter came to call a “military ERP”—security guarantees under a North Atlantic Treaty Organization. It was this combination of aid, integration, and security which underlay western Europe’s remarkable recovery.

In short, the foundation that enabled American economic statecraft to be so successful in post-war Europe is lacking in the cases of Iraq and Afghanistan, or Ukraine and Syria. Financial aid cannot on its own bring peace, political reform, or even economic stability. Given the insatiable desire to create new Marshall Plans around the globe, it is critical to recognize that physical security is prerequisite for economic revival.

  • Benn Steil is director of International Economics at the Council on Foreign Relations and author, most recently, of "The Marshall Plan: Dawn of the Cold War." Full bio


From our Russian News Desk. (The views expressed are the author‘s own.)

  • Strategic Stabilization: A Window of Opportunities for Russia and the U.S.

April 4, 2018 – Sarmat / Satan-2 launch – Dmitry Stefanovich

Independent expert

“Despite the belligerent nuclear statements by Russia and the U.S. in the first quarter of 2018, the configuration of a possible future for the international arms control regimes can be seen beyond the veil of rhetoric.”

  • Four Years of EU–Ukraine Association: Teething Problems or Permanent Crisis?

April 9, 2018 – REUTERS/Valentyn Ogirenko –

Aleksandr Gushchin (PhD in History, Associate Professor, Department of Post-Soviet Countries, Russian State University for the Humanities, RIAC expert)

“The Ukraine–European Union Association Agreement came into force in 2017. March 2018 marked four years since the signing of the political provisions of the agreement. This is a long enough period to try and assess, however briefly, Ukraine’s achievements on the difficult path towards association with the European Union. This appears particularly relevant given the fact that the past several years have been the most difficult in Ukraine’s post-Soviet history….” (recommend. UvM)

Caucasian Knot. NEWS.

  • Battalion of military police returns from Syria to Ingushetia
  • NGOs criticize Georgia’s proposals to residents of Abkhazia and South Ossetia

The Georgian authorities have offered residents of Abkhazia and South Ossetia to use the "Step to Better Future" programme, which provides for the expansion of trade ties, support for common business projects, training at Georgian universities and chances to visit EU countries without a visa.

Activists of the NGOs established by refugees from Abkhazia and South Ossetia have stated that their fellow countrymen are not ready to accept these proposals.

Georgian authorities intend to create a special economic zone and introduce incentives for doing businesses by residents of Abkhazia and South Ossetia…

Residents of Abkhazia are not ready for such cooperation, as interpersonal relations are not settled….

For example, Abkhazian products fail to meet the EU standards; and they cannot be exported. Also, when conducting any joint business, problems usually arise; and they will be always backed "by unsettled ethnic relations; and this may end very badly."

Let us remind you that on March 9, Georgian Prime Minister Giorgi Kvirikashvili announced his readiness for a dialogue with the authorities of Russia, Abkhazia and South Ossetia. The opposition treated it as a sign of "impotence" and readiness to concede to Russia.

Full text of the article is available on the Russian page of 24/7 Internet agency ‘Caucasian Knot’.


Policy= res publica

Freudenberg-Pilster* David Schenker Nominated to Be Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs

Washington Institute congratulates scholar-practitioner on appointment to top Mideast diplomatic post.

(Washington, D.C. – April 10) The Washington Institute for Near East Policy congratulates David Schenker, director of the organization’s Program on Arab Politics, on his nomination to be assistant secretary of state for Near Eastern affairs.

"This is an inspired appointment," said Institute Executive Director Robert Satloff. "As the director of our Arab politics program for more than a decade, David has led Institute research and programming on a broad array of regional topics during an especially turbulent period. He will undoubtedly enrich U.S. Middle East policy with his deep scholarship and his valuable experience as a public official. America’s interests in security and peace in the region will be better for his service."
If confirmed by the Senate, Schenker — the Institute’s Aufzien Fellow — will become the State Department’s senior official responsible for Middle East issues.

"We are proud of the fact that David Schenker will be the latest in a long line of Institute experts to join the government in senior positions — in both Republican and Democratic administrations — to provide expertise on the Middle East," said Institute President Shelly Kassen and Chairman Martin J. Gross.

Schenker has served as director of the Institute’s Program on Arab Politics since 2006. Previously, he served in the George W. Bush administration as Levant country director in the Office of the Secretary of Defense, in which capacity he was responsible for advising the secretary and senior Pentagon leaders on the military and political affairs of Syria, Lebanon, Jordan, Israel, and the Palestinian territories. His service was recognized with the Office of the Secretary of Defense Medal for Exceptional Civilian Service in 2005.

Prior to joining the Pentagon, Schenker was a research fellow at the Institute, focusing on Arab governance. The author of books on Iraq and Jordan and on Palestinian politics, his commentary on Arab affairs appears often in prominent scholarly journals and leading media outlets. Fluent in Arabic, Schenker received his master’s degree from the University of Michigan and his undergraduate degree from the University of Vermont.

About the Washington Institute: The Washington Institute is an independent, nonpartisan research institution funded exclusively by U.S. citizens that seeks to advance a balanced and realistic understanding of American interests in the Middle East and to promote the policies that secure them. Drawing on the research of its fellows and the experience of its policy practitioners, the Institute promotes informed debate and scholarly research on U.S. policy in the region.


Politics: From Vision to Action

Barandat* Reuters: Japan activates first marines since WW2 to bolster defenses against China

at Apr 7, 2018 / 2:49 AM EDT

(Reuters) – Japan on Saturday activated its first marine unit since World War Two trained to counter invaders occupying Japanese islands along the edge of the East China Sea that Tokyo fears are vulnerable to attack by China.

Soldiers of Japanese Ground Self-Defense Force (JGSDF)’s Amphibious Rapid Deployment Brigade, Japan’s first marine unit since World War Two,

gather at a ceremony activating the brigade at JGSDF’s Camp Ainoura in Sasebo, on the southwest island of Kyushu, Japan April 7, 2018.

In a ceremony held at a military base near Sasebo on the southwest island of Kyushu, about 1,500 members of the Amphibious Rapid Deployment Brigade (ARDB) wearing camouflage lined up outside amid cold, windy weather.

"Given the increasingly difficult defense and security situation surrounding Japan, defense of our islands has become a critical mandate," Tomohiro Yamamoto, vice defense minister, said in a speech.

The troops conducted a 20-minute mock public exercise recapturing a remote island from invaders.

The formation of the Japanese marine brigade is controversial because amphibious units can project military force and could, critics warn, be used to threaten Japan’s neighbors. In its post World War Two constitution Japan renounced the right to wage war.

The brigade is the latest component of a growing marine force that includes helicopter carriers, amphibious ships, Osprey tilt-rotor troop carriers and amphibious assault vehicles, meant to deter China as it pushes for easier access to the Western Pacific.

China, which dominates the South China Sea, is outpacing Japan in defense spending. In 2018, Beijing which claims a group of uninhabited islets in the East China Sea controlled by Tokyo, will spend 1.11 trillion yuan ($176.56 billion) on its armed forces, more than three times as much as Japan.

The activation of the 2,100 strong ARDB takes Japan a step closer to creating a force similar to a U.S. Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) able to plan and execute operations at sea far from its home base.

"They’ve already demonstrated the ability to put together an ad hoc MEU. But to have a solid, standing MEU capability requires concerted effort," Grant Newsham, a research fellow at the Japan Forum for Strategic Studies.

"If Japan put its mind to it, within a year or year and a half it could have a reasonable capability."

Newsham, who helped train Japan’s first amphibious troops as a U.S. Marine Corps colonel liaison officer assigned to the Ground Self Defense Force (GSDF), said Japan still needs a joint navy-army amphibious headquarters to coordinate operations as well as more amphibious ships to carry troops and equipment. Japanese military planners are already mulling some of those additions. Its Air Self Defense Force (ASDF) wants to acquire F-35Bs to operate from its Izumo and Ise helicopter carriers, or from islands along the East China Sea, sources have told Reuters.

The United States last month deployed its F-35Bs for their first at-sea operations aboard the USS Wasp amphibious assault ship, which is based in Sasebo. The Kyushu port is also home to Japan’s Ise and close to the ARDB’s base. Separately the GSDF may acquire small amphibious ships up to a 100 meters (328.08 ft) long to transport troops and equipment between islands and from ship to shore, two sources familiar with the discussion said. Japanese ground forces have not operated their own ships since World War Two.

"The idea is to bring forces and gear on large ships to the main Okinawa island and then disperse them to other islands on smaller vessels," said one of the sources, who asked not to be identified because they are not authorized to talk to the media.


Middle East

The National Interest: Striking Syria Again Would Be a Grave Mistake for America (and President Trump)

John Allen Gay

The first day of a new job is always rough. But pity incoming National Security Advisor John Bolton, who will probably not even have time to unpack. His first crisis has arrived before he has. Dozens of civilians are dead east of Damascus, apparently killed in a chlorine gas attack by the Assad regime. Footage circulating on social media shows the dead packed in a basement shelter: men, women, children, all lifeless.

Bolton’s new boss tweeted Sunday that there was a “big price to pay” and suggested that Barack Obama should have snuffed out “Animal Assad” during a similar crisis five years ago. The Joint Chiefs of Staff are reportedly set to present Trump with military options against Syria. We may see a rerun of the cruise missile strike last year on a Syrian air base. If this happens, few will shed tears for Assad’s men. But a strike would be a double error for the United States. First, it would not address a vital U.S. national security interest. Our military strength can deter similar attacks on America. Second, a strike would erode the rule of law here at home. Under the Constitution, the president does not have the power to initiate war. The Syria threat is not so serious that we should break our laws to address it.

War and death in a far corner of the world do not automatically threaten vital U.S. national interests. Our “detached and distant situation,” to borrow a phrase from George Washington, means that we rarely face direct threats to our territory, to our fundamental prosperity, or to the independence and openness of our government. We have no strong neighbors that are about to invade us. Threats to the United States tend to be indirect: for example, Al Qaeda, under the protection of the Taliban, plotted attacks against America from Afghanistan. In the early Cold War, the Soviet Union had the potential to sweep into war-ravaged Western Europe. Had it dominated that region’s vast population and economic potential, it could have challenged America on the global stage and even projected serious power into our hemisphere.

Bashar al-Assad can barely dominate the Damascus suburbs, much less amass the power for a direct attack on America. Russia and Iran have gained influence in Syria by backing Assad. But they, too, are unlikely to turn Syria into a dagger at America’s throat. Divided and in ruins, Syria is a liability to whomever owns it. That won’t change for some time. Any threat to America from Syria, and from gas attacks in Syria, has to be very indirect.

Those who want to strike Assad again argue that there is an international norm against the use of chemical weapons and that this norm makes it less likely that chemical weapons will be used against Americans. If “the international community,” which in this context means “the U.S. military,” looks the other way at chemical attacks, chemical weapons will come to be used more frequently in war. They then may eventually be used against American troops or even American civilians. Sohrab Ahmari made this argument succinctly in Commentary on Sunday morning: “Intervention is necessary to deter use of illegal weapons. If [Assad] gets away with it, as he has (mainly owing to Obama’s pusillanimity), other nasty regimes will conclude that they can, too. That will eventually threaten Western security.” Ahmari brands this “Boltonian realism.”

Yet realism weakens the case that strikes on Syria are necessary to nip in the bud a long chain of events that ends in tangible harm to America. Realists share Bolton and Ahmari’s dim estimation of human nature. States act on self-interest and do not follow the niceties favored by those Bolton scornfully calls the “High-Minded.” Bad, norm-breaking behavior is likely if it yields benefits. As the ur-realist Thucydides put it, "the strong do what they can and the weak suffer what they must." Assad knows we, too, are strong. His self-interest and our strength intersect to deter him from using his chemical weapons against us, lest he face our vengeance. Fear of retaliation, not norms, kept the Germans, Italians, and Japanese—all enthusiastic gassers of weaker foes—from using the weapons against the Western Allies in World War II. Recent incidents outside Syria—in which advanced chemical weapons were used for assassination—were conducted by states whose nuclear deterrents make retaliation hard and whose targets had little power projection capability. The United States need only speak softly and continue to carry its big stick to deter chemical strikes on itself.

But suppose I’m wrong and Ahmari is right: even our mighty military and nuclear arsenal can’t stop the long chain of events that ends in Americans being gassed. Or suppose, as others argue, that the norm against chemical weapons is vital for protecting foreign civilians, and that America is the world’s policeman, prosecutor, judge, and jury, and must thus enforce the norm. There’s still a second danger: to rule of law here in America.

If Trump repeats the pattern of last year’s strike, he’ll launch the attack on his own authority, citing his power under Article II of the Constitution. It’s still not clear precisely what reasoning the administration’s lawyers were using to define the scope of that power. But it is clear that he was acting far beyond the limits the Founders envisioned when they divided the power to make war between the executive (as commander in chief of the armed forces) and the legislature (which, under Article I, Section 8, Clause 11 of the Constitution, has the sole power to declare war). Legal scholar Andrew Kent has argued that “under the best reading of the original understanding of constitutional war powers, President Trump’s strike on Syria was patently unconstitutional.” Kent had written that

A vast array of members of the Founding generation opined without dissent that the Constitution had […] empowered Congress alone to decide whether to initiate foreign war. . . . Major figures whose views about this issue are essentially beyond dispute include George Washington, James Madison, Alexander Hamilton, John Marshall, James Wilson, Thomas Jefferson, John Adams, William Paterson, James Monroe, Pierce Butler, James Iredell, Samuel Chase, Henry Knox, and Charles Pinckney. On the other hand, I am not aware of a single instance in which a prominent member of the Founding generation expressed the view that the Constitution authorized the president to decide whether to initiate a foreign war.

It is noteworthy that even Hamilton, who craved a strong executive, is counted among the presidential war opponents. Yet today’s presidents, left and right alike, have initiated wars without consulting Congress. Even the permissive War Powers Resolution has been ignored—most notably by the Obama administration, which declined to seek Congressional approval to continue the air war in Libya.

Why would the Founders restrict the president’s war power? The same realistic assessment of human nature that shapes the rest of the Constitution. John Jay, in Federalist No. 4, warned that monarchs wage wars that serve no national interest out of “thirst for military glory, revenge for personal affronts, ambition, or private compacts to aggrandize or support their particular families or partisans.” Or, as Kent puts it:

A president might have troubling foreign ties or be corrupted by an adversary; be driven by ego, a desire for glory, madness, short-sightedness, or stupidity; be influenced by pernicious political advisers; or be motivated to attempt solve domestic political troubles by ginning up a foreign war in order to benefit from the ‘rally round the flag’ effect.

A president might also have bad judgment or, surrounded by federal officials that never have to face voters to be held to account for their performance, fail to adequately consider the general interest. All this led the Founders to defy the European monarchic model and separate the power to initiate war from the power to conduct war. And, more deeply, America was founded on the notion of human fallibility: that nobody is perfect, that even virtuous, well-educated, and public-spirited leaders could err gravely or succumb to power’s temptations. The Founders therefore set power against power, and placed war in the hands of legislators who faced the possibility of swift rebuke from the voters. They did not entrust the war power to presidents, who stood to gain popularity and power from wars.

This system does not guarantee a perfect foreign policy. Congress authorized force against Iraq in 2002. But it does make mistakes less likely: it forces the president to convince hundreds of legislators that war is indeed in the national interest. One man’s error is not enough to lead the nation to disaster.

Of course, in the event of an attack on the United States itself, such as a foreign invasion (a real possibility in the founding era), it would be foolish to wait for Congress to take a vote before reacting. There may even be cases in which a preemptive war (meaning war to repel an imminent attack, not an Iraq-style war to prevent a possible future threat) would be necessary.

Syria is not one of those cases. Even if attack proponents are correct that chemical weapons uses anywhere can quickly metastasize into a direct threat to America, a response in days or weeks will be no less effective at signalling U.S. intentions. There is plenty of time for the president to seek Congressional authorization. Congress is even in session this week. If the threat is truly grave, they will surely drop everything to empower the president to take action. And their authorization would make clear that Trump is not alone in his desire to punish chemical weapons users, amplifying the strategic message sent by the strike.

The threat to America from gas attacks in Syria is limited, and therefore a strike is not necessary. But if I’m wrong, it is not a threat that requires the president to act instantly. A few days or weeks are not enough for a total breakdown in any norm against using chemical weapons. There is no excuse for the president to go around the Constitution and Congress to strike Syria.

John Allen Gay is executive director of the John Quincy Adams Society, a national network of student groups centered on a vision of foreign policy restraint. He is a former managing editor of the National Interest.


*Massenbach’s Recommendation*

Nord-West Zeitung (Oldenburg) – Kommentar – Zum Syrischen Bürgerkrieg : Hilfloser Westen –

Von Alexander Will

Wenn es um Chemiewaffenangriffe in Syrien geht, bleiben jede Menge Fragen offen, kommentiert NWZ-Nachrichtenchef Alexander Will. Zudem hat der Westen wegen seines eigenen Versagens in der Vergangenheit nun keine Optionen mehr, das Blutvergießen zu beenden.

OldenburgSyrien erinnert derzeit an ein Déjà-vu-Erlebnis. Es ist der Kreislauf von angeblichem Giftgasangriff, lautstarken gegenseitigen Vorwürfen, UN-Aktivitäten, Luftangriffen und Rückkehr zum Bürgerkriegsalltag. Dabei gibt es immer jede Menge Ungereimtheiten, und der Westen agiert in einer Weise, die Hilflosigkeit und den Fluch der verpassten Gelegenheit erkennen lässt.

Zunächst ist es auffällig, dass Giftgasangriffe immer dann berichtet werden, wenn die syrische Regierungsarmee einen militärischen Erfolg erzielt hat, oder kurz davor steht. Das galt für Aleppo, und das gilt heute für Ost-Ghuta. Nur: Warum sollte eine bereits siegreiche Armee C-Waffen einsetzen? Und: Warum sollte die politische Führung diesen mühsam errungen Sieg durch das Risiko einer westlichen Intervention nach dem Einsatz der geächteten Waffe gefährden? Das will nicht einleuchten.

Selbst wenn es C-Waffen-Angriffe gegeben haben sollte, bleibt immer noch unklar, wer dafür verantwortlich ist. Zu Beginn des Bürgerkrieges ist die syrische Armee auseinandergebrochen. Niemand kann ausschließen, dass den abtrünnigen Militärs C-Waffen in die Hände gefallen sind – am wenigsten westliche Geheimdienste, die in Syrien so oft daneben lagen. Zudem muss man anerkennen, dass die Assad-Regierung in der ersten Phase des Bürgerkrieges große Bestände an C-Waffen unter internationaler Aufsicht vernichten ließ. Fazit: Niemand kann mit Sicherheit sagen, wer genau da wann, welche Waffen eingesetzt hat.

Der Westen wird wohl bei seiner Reaktion wieder nicht über hilfloses Bomben hinauskommen. Das Zeitfenster für eine massive militärische Intervention, die ganz allein den Bürgerkrieg hätte beenden können, ist seit Beginn des russischen Engagements geschlossen. Jetzt können Franzosen und Amerikaner zwar einige Bomben werfen. Alles, was darüber hinaus geht, bedeutet aber Krieg mit Moskau.,1,1329559407.html

  • By the way: Geopolitical Intelligence Service – Turkey, Iran and the potential for peace in Syria.

06 April 2018. Author: Prince Michael of Liechtenstein.

„ ….If the three powers can find some arrangement that all of them can live with, it could lead to a solution in Syria without the West’s involvement. The U.S. already announced its intention to withdraw from Syria. This decision could improve U.S.-Turkish relations, as it would eliminate the problem of a potential standoff between two NATO partners in the Kurdish-controlled regions of Syria. The Kurdish militias based in these areas have been valuable U.S. allies fighting Daesh (also known as Islamic State or ISIS). What is in everybody’s interest is that the bloodshed ends.

Despite all the differences, realpolitikcan lead the three powers to barter and support a solution.

Unfortunately, a solution in Syria will not bring an end to the tensions that were created by the region’s arbitrary division between the United Kingdom and France during World War I. The result of the 1919 peace talks will continue to haunt this area.

It will remain a flash point for the region’s powers – Turkey, Iran, Saudi Arabia and Israel – allowing global powers to intervene. Whatever peace is coming to Syria, it will not necessarily be sustainable in the long term.”,2515,c.html


Still a topic: Blick-durch-die-Wirtschaft, Frankfurt, 18 Jan 1981:

„Wie anders sind die Moslems? Araber in einer fremden Gedankenwelt.

Nur der Abbau von Clichévorstellungen öffnet den Zugang zu andersdenkenden Partnern.“

For more see attachment.



see our letter on:

*Herausgegeben von Udo von Massenbach, Bärbel Freudenberg-Pilster, Joerg Barandat*


01-08-1981 Blick_durch_die_Wirtschaft- Wie anders sind die Mosl.pdf

04-10-18 US_Russia_Strategic_Stabilzation, Ukraine_EU_Russia, Caucasian News.pdf