Massenbach-Letter: NEWS 22/05/15

Massenbach-Letter. News

· Marxism in the Post-Globalization Era*Unvollständige Übersicht: Zur Zeit vergessene Hotspots

· The Tattered German-American Relationship Needs the USA FREEDOM Act

· Equal Society Brief: Zeit für Familie und Beruf – Was Mütter und Väter wollen

· DISA’s Security Technical Implementation Guides

· Why did the Iraqi army flee another city in the face of ISIS?

· EIA launches redesigned International Energy Portal

Massenbach* US Special Ops raid killing five ISIS chiefs had to be coordinated with Syria and Russia

The US Delta Special Operations raid that killed ISIS oil chief Abu Sayyaf Saturday, May 16, could not have taken place without prior US coordination with Damascus and Moscow, debkafile’s military sources report. The National Security Council spokeswoman Bernadette Meehan announced after the raid: “The US government did not coordinate with the Syrian regime, nor did we advise them in advance of the operation.” But that statement did not preclude a possible US notice of the coming raid to Moscow, which then passed it on to Damascus.
The operation therefore fixed more than one new Middle East landmark: Not only did the US put its first boots on the ground in Syria, but the US, Russia and the Assad regime seem to be pulling together for the first time against the Islamic State – much in the same way as Washington is funneling its cooperation with Iran against ISIS through Baghdad.

Our military sources note that the area of operation – Al-Amar some 20 km southeast of Deir El-Zour in eastern Syria – is bristling with Syrian air defense units, while Russian air defense facilities cover the distance from there to Damascus. How likely is it that they all missed the helicopters which dropped US troops?

It is even more unlikely, given the details of the operation coming to light Sunday, May 17. It now appears that Abu Sayyaf was not the only target, but that 32 ISIS fighters were killed in the same compound including four more of its leaders – all them Moroccans. American sources identified one of them as the group’s military chief, Abo Omar al-Shishani.

The daring Delta raid can said to have failed in one important respect: None of the five high-value ISIS leaders was caught alive – or any of their 27 bodyguards. The main object of the mission was to catch five top Islamist State leaders to demonstrate America’s long arm against its enemies, as well drawing from them every scrap of intelligence under questioning.

Alternatively, they would have served as bargaining chips for saving the lives of any more Americans taken hostage by the Islamist terrorists.
The commanders of the operation can congratulate themselves on two feats: The entire raider force returned unscathed – was one; and, two, it captured a large cache of digital and other documentation which should offer up precious data on ISIS’s finances and its command hierarchy.

With the technology available today, Abu Sayyaf, aka Abu Muhammad al-Iraqi or Abd al-Ghani, could have been liquidated by pushing a button from a US drone base in Jordan, Iraq or an aircraft carrier on the Mediterranean, and saved risking US troops by dropping them deep inside an ISIS military compound. One or more drones armed with laser-guided bombs could have hovered overhead.

On the other hand, only a large group of elite combatants (estimated at 70-100), dropped on target by V-22 and Black Hawk copters, could have penetrated the offices and homes of the Islamic State’s financial chief and stripped his computers and other digital storage units of documents recording the movements of personnel and money.
To carry out its mission, the Delta force must have had back-up from hundreds of fighting men in the first and second circles of response, as well as medical, logistics, electronic warfare, intelligence and communications personnel and also air cover.

UAVs overhead would have fed the unit intelligence in real time.
The only way the elite US unit could have operated without fear of being cut down by massive ground-to-ground missile fire from Syrian forces close to the scene was if prior directives were handed down to the Syrian and Russian air defense units to hold their fire. Those batteries are equipped to identify any object taking to the sky in the Middle East. Without their cooperation in turning a blind eye to the unusual US military activity during a “working window” of a few hours, the helicopters carrying the raiders to target would have entered a missile death trap and suffered great loss of life.

It is more than likely that this arrangement was secretly set up when US Secretary of State John Kerry visited Russian President Vladimir Putin in Sochi on May 12. It may be assumed that the Russian leader quietly approved the operation and acceded to Kerry’s request to give Damascus a heads-up.



Taking the US fight against IS into Syria would consolidate Assad and his Iranian-Hizballah allies*

British and German intelligence sources reported Saturday, Aug. 23, that US intelligence aid to the Assad regime, channeled through German BND intelligence, had enabled the Syrian air force to more precisely target al Qaeda units. These reports tie in with proliferating accounts from Washington that President Barack Obama is on the point of a decision to extend military strikes into Syria for targeting the Islamic State’s terrorist base. He has been warned by some top US generals that IS poses a threat to the United States and cannot be seriously engaged without dealing with the group’s Syrian stronghold. “We’re not going to be restricted by borders,” said Ben Rhodes, Obama’s deputy national security adviser, in a comment Thursday.

DEBKAfile’s military and intelligence sources report that there is no confirmation from the ground in Syria that Washington is indeed passing intelligence to Syria through Berlin to help the Syrian air force reach IS targets.

The fact is that Syria is falling well short of arresting the IS advance on two critical fronts:

1. Aleppo. The Islamist threat looms grimly over an approaching Syrian-Hizballah military victory, under Iranian commanders, in Aleppo, Syria’s largest city. They have come close to dislodging rebel forces from their last footholds, only to be faced with a new enemy. In the last fortnight, al Qaeda forces armed with American weapons taken booty in Iraq have surged out of their northern Syrian stronghold of Raqqa to capture dozens of villages around the city.

2. Tabqa Air Base. IS forces have pinned down some 1,000 Syrian air force and military personnel in the Tabqa air base southwest of Raqqa. They are locked in fierce combat. Every attempt by the Syrian army in the last two weeks to break the siege has been repelled by the Islamists.
via Taking the US fight against IS into Syria would consolidate Assad and his Iranian-Hizballah allies.



The Tattered German-American Relationship Needs the USA FREEDOM Act *

*More for What It Doesn’t Do than for What It Does*

Congress is debating the USA FREEDOM Act in the next days. The House approved Representative Jim Sensenbrenner’s version of the law on Wednesday and the Senate is expected to vote on Senator Mike Lee’s companion bill next week. The law requires the American Intelligence Community to fulfill its important mandate within a legal framework of limits and oversight that shows greater concern for Americans’ privacy. The Act aims to prevent the mass collection of Americans’ communications data by requiring that such programs be limited to more carefully targeted anti-terror efforts. The Act also reforms the secretive Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act Court. The Court’s undisclosed, expansive interpretation of the law gave the National Security Agency (NSA) legal justification for its most controversial programs. The Act would require the Court to appoint outside counsel to counter government lawyers’ arguments for new interpretations of the law. It requires the Director of National Intelligence to declassify and publicize the Court’s most significant decisions. Finally, the Act requires the Inspectors General of the Department of Justice and the Intelligence Community to audit the effectiveness and utility of the government’s data collection programs over the last half-decade. The law would be a significant reform, even if it falls short of the demands of many privacy advocates.

The USA FREEDOM Act also might have been a timely, redemptive signal to our German partners. But it will disappoint the Germans, too. This missed opportunity is profound because the Germans have just turned a new, more troubling corner in the twisting saga they refer to as the NSA-Affäre. Edward Snowden’s disclosures revealed that the Germans have been the objects of the NSA’s ravenous gaze, leaving them outraged and disillusioned. But in the last days, thanks in part to the discoveries of the special parliamentary committee investigating the NSA-Scandal, Germans have learned that their Foreign Intelligence Service (Bundesnachrichtendienst – BND) has been a willing facilitator of the NSA’s surveillance and data collection in Europe, including operations that targeted European defense firms and French government officials. And it seems that the BND has been dissembling, if not dishonest, about all of this in its responses to the German parliament’s demands for an accounting of its role in the NSA-Scandal. The fraying German-American relationship, now strained by resentment over the possibility that the NSA has made marionettes of the BND, may have reached its nadir.

For several reasons, the USA FREEDOM Act won’t do much to repair this old partnership.

First, the Act doesn’t reform the parts of the law most relevant to the German experience. The USA FREEDOM Act seeks to limit the Intelligence Community’s ability to make use of the authority under the USA PATRIOT Act to obtain “business records.” The Section 215 power allowed the NSA to collect, in bulk and for more than a decade, Americans’ “telephony metadata” from telecommunications service providers. But the Germans are most upset about the NSA’s PRISM program. Under the authority of Section 702 of the 2008 Amendments to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, the NSA has been collecting the content of foreigners’ Internet communications for years. PRISM has become synonymous in Germany with NSA abuses. The petition (“Angemessene Reaktion auf die NSA-Affäre”) organized by the German novelist Juli Zeh resulted in an open letter to Chancellor Angela Merkel—with 65,000 signatures. The letter opens with a reference to Edward Snowden’s revelation of the PRISM program.

The USA FREEDOM Act, which leaves Section 702 untouched, will do nothing to limit the NSA’s foreign operations that do not implicate Americans. It remains steadfastly the view of a broad spectrum of policymakers that American law does not and should not restrict America’s foreign intelligence initiatives.

Second, the Act’s focus on reining in the American Intelligence Community (even in its interaction with private sector Internet and telecommunications providers) isn’t broad enough to address Germans’ more general concerns about privacy. For Germans the issue is not just about the state’s power to investigative and conduct surveillance. They see the NSA’s activities—implicating as they do our thoroughly digitized and networked reality—as just one facet of an abstract, holistic, and inclusive human right they call “data protection.” This comprehensive liberty interest encompasses, simultaneously, private sector uses of our data and the government’s security (or welfare state) interest in our data. The German legal system, conditioned as it is by the civil law tradition’s orientation toward abstract legal principles, is uniquely susceptible to this conceptual approach. The USA FREEDOM Act doesn’t—and can’t—speak to such a broad framing of the issue. American law is characterized by the common law’s orientation to facts and context. This justifies the distinct legal regimes American law applies to privacy interests relative to the state’s collection and use of our data, on one hand, and the private sector’s collection and use of our data, on the other hand. Further evidence of this deep split between Germany and the United States is the fact that data protection in the commercial arena in the United States is itself given different treatment across various industrial sectors, each with its unique interests and parameters. To Germans the USA FREEDOM Act will look unsatisfyingly narrow in its discrete approach to the issue but that has less to do with the Act, than it does with the two societies’ distinct approaches to privacy.

Third, the USA FREEDOM Act’s emphasis on internal audits and enhanced legislative oversight will not reassure Germans. Following the abuses of the Nazi tyranny, the German postwar constitutional order shifted heavily toward the judicial enforcement of an “objective order of values” to protect against the spectral failures of democratic processes. It is often noted—with an eye toward the Gestapo and the Stasi—that this distrust has special force with respect to the state’s security and intelligence activities. The German Federal Constitutional Court pioneered the concept of “informational self-determination” and in recent years it has aggressively enforced Germans’ privacy and data-protection interests. But Americans have made completely different experiences. We have not passed through the searing trauma of a tyrannical, murderous state regime. And we have seen the corrective potential of the democratic process at those moments when we’ve neared those gates. In part, this is why the story of American policy on these issues cannot be told through landmark Supreme Court decisions, as is the case in nearly every other segment of American life. Instead, the story consists in courageous legislative reactions, none more historic than the Church Committee in the mid-1970s. The USA FREEDOM Act undeniably participates in this unique tradition. But it won’t persuade the Germans, who will be unconvinced by non-judicial checks on the state’s power.

The USA FREEDOM Act will be a disappointment to Germans. Still, it might do the tattered transatlantic relationship some service. If not for what it does, then perhaps for what it doesn’t do.

First, the shortcomings in the Act might provide Germans with valuable comparative insight as they consider reform of their intelligence community oversight regime. The Germans will face similar challenges.

German law, for example, also does not limit foreign intelligence activities. If these operations involve surveillance of telecommunications, then Article 10 of the Grundgesetz (Basic Law or constitution) would seem to guarantee their secrecy. But Article 10 was amended in 1968 to allow for telecommunications surveillance pursuant to a federal statutory framework. That regime, known as the G10 Act, authorizes but also strictly limits the German intelligence community’s telecommunications surveillance. A central component of that regime is the establishment of the G10 Commission, an auxiliary organ of the parliament that is charged with reviewing and authorizing all of the intelligence community’s planned telecommunications surveillance initiatives. The G10 Commission reviews all of these operations—except those involving foreign telecommunications activities. The BND, with the blessing of the Federal Government, has concluded that the G10 Act does not apply to the surveillance of telecommunications that take place outside Germany. The Federal Government confirmed this in its presentation of facts in an important challenge to the G10 Act that was decided by the German Federal Constitutional Court in 1999. In that case the Federal Minister of the Interior explained that, of the approximately 15,000 telecommunications acts the BND screened each day, only approximately 700 fell “under the authority of the G10 Act,” which provides for the G10 Commission’s oversight. The Federal Government more recently confirmed the BND’s pursuit of unregulated surveillance outside Germany in the answers it provided to a set of formal parliamentary questions presented to it by the Left Party. The Government explained that, in those circumstances, the BND pursues strategic telecommunications surveillance under the exclusive authority of Paragraph 1(2) of the BND Act and need not conform its operations to the G10 Act. On these terms the BND can monitor and collect data on the telecommunications traffic of whole states or world-regions without constitutional or statutory limits so long as the German territory or a German citizen is not implicated.

A growing chorus of scholars and commentators thinks the Federal Government’s position on foreign telecommunications surveillance violates German constitutional law. They argue that the telecommunications privacy secured by Article 10 of the Basic Law must apply outside the German territory, including the G10 Act’s strict framework for exceptional departures from that constitutional guarantee. These critics wonder if the technology involved in the contemporary telecommunications infrastructure has rendered territorial distinctions of this kind obsolete. The critics also argue that the Federal Government’s stance involves a troubling misreading of the Basic Law, which they say does not recognize territorial parameters on the limits it imposes on German state power. Instead, these commentators argue that all German state authority, regardless of where in the world it is exercised, must show respect for the rights secured by the Basic Law.

The USA FREEDOM Act does nothing new to limit American intelligence gathering outside the United States. This jealously held position is based on the notions that American law does not require it and that, as a practical matter, limits on American foreign intelligence operations could be fatally contradictory to the whole purpose of maintaining an intelligence capability. It will be interesting to see if German privacy advocates can overcome these notions—both legal and practical—and do more to limit the authority of the German intelligence community to pursue foreign telecommunications intelligence gathering.

All the structural barriers that bedevil effective legislative oversight of the NSA also exist in Germany, including deficiencies in legislators’ technical competence, the risk-averse logic of a democratic system that would hold elected representatives accountable for deadly terror attacks or security lapses, and the power of an entrenched and self-justifying intelligence community. The secretive G10 Commission, for example, does no better than the FISA Court to protect privacy. Some commentators have raised questions about the intensity with which the G10 Commission pursues its mandate, just as the FISA Court’s rigor has come to be questioned. In 2013, for example, the G10 Commission considered a total of 25,526 monitoring measures (including all facets of its authority to review and authorize targeted and strategic monitoring). That is a staggering average of 2,127 actions considered at each of its monthly sessions. Of course, many of these individual requests are grouped as part a single ministerial order. Still, in a four or five hour session, the Commission must work through as many as 70 of these orders. One media report estimated that, at most, the Commission devotes five minutes to each order it reviews. The Commission’s proceedings also are not adversarial. This means that the Commissioners themselves, despite their regular and close work with the relevant ministries and intelligence community representatives, are the sole voices for Germans’ privacy interests. The insularity of the FISA Court’s proceedings is loosened marginally by the USA FREEDOM Act. This will be no easier to achieve with respect to the G10 Commission. Some observers have also wondered whether the integrity of the G10 Commission’s scrutiny may be undermined by the limits on the resources at its disposal. The practical effect of the constraints on the G10 Commission’s review is that the Commission simply “waves through everything the intelligence community wants.” Former Commission Chairman Hans de With has offered only a modest correction of this critique. He guessed that the Commission disallows fewer than 10 percent of the orders it reviews. Even this nominal rejection rate is less reassuring than de With may have intended it to be. In the few cases in which the Commission does not get adequate answers to its questions, former Chairman de With explained that the Commission simply urges the BND to “come back next month,” presumably with the information needed to permit the Commission to authorize the order. All of this has led some commentators to characterize the review provided by the G10 Commission as structurally inadequate.

Second, the USA FREEDOM Act dramatically highlights some of the fundamental, structural differences between Germans and Americans on these issues. It would be a considerable service to German-American relations if the Act helped us to grapple—in respectful but realistic terms—with the kinds of dissimilarities the USA FREEDOM Act exposes. Only from that more informed posture will we be able to identify the areas and issues about which we can hope for genuine cooperation.

Russell A. Miller is a Professor of Law at Washington & Lee University. He is also a DAAD/AICGS Research Fellow, a former Fellow at the Center for Security and Society at the University of Freiburg, and the Editor-in-Chief of the German Law Journal. He is the author/editor of a number of books, including: Privacy and Power: Transatlantic Relations in the Shadow of the NSA-Affair (forthcoming 2016); The Constitutional Jurisprudence of the Federal Republic of Germany (Duke University Press 2012), and U.S. National Security, Intelligence and Democracy (Routledge 2009).


Policy= res publica

Freudenberg-Pilster* Equal Society Brief: Zeit für Familie und Beruf – Was Mütter und Väter wollen*

Mai beteiligten sich unter dem Motto "Die Arbeit der Zukunft gestalten wir!" mehr als 400.000 Menschen an den DGB-Kundgebungen zum Tag der Arbeit. Doch: Was wollen Frauen und Männer, Mütter und Väter, wenn es um die Zukunft ihrer Arbeit geht?

Dieser Frage gehen in der neuen Ausgabe des Equal Society Brief die Autor_innen Barbara König, Jonathan Menge und Christina Schildmann mit Blick auf die Arbeitszeitwünsche nach. In "Inside the Gap 2/3: Zeit für Familie und Beruf – Was Mütter und Väter wollen" haben sie interessante Fakten zusammengestellt und formulieren Politikempfehlungen. Sie stellen fest, dass eine große Diskrepanz zwischen den Arbeitsmarktnormen und -realitäten sowie dem wachsenden Wunsch nach partnerschaftlicher Aufteilung von Erwerbs- und Sorgearbeit besteht. Vor diesem Hintergrund begrüßen sie sehr, dass die Debatte über die Neuverteilung der Erwerbsarbeit zwischen Männer und Frauen in wachsender Intensität in Politik, Gewerkschaften und Medien geführt wird.

Auch zivilgesellschaftliche Initiativen nutzten den Tag der Arbeit, um auf ihre gesellschaftspolitischen Anliegen aufmerksam zu machen. Unter anderem erklärte die Initiative Care.Macht.Mehr den 1. Mai zum Tag der unsichtbaren Arbeit und spricht damit ein Problem an, dem sich die Autor_innen in der ersten Ausgabe des Equal Society Brief "Inside the Gap 1/3: Der Gender Pay Gap – Die große Lücke ist unbezahlt!" widmeten. Die überwiegende Last im Bereich der unbezahlten Arbeit tragen Frauen, ein wesentlicher Faktor, wenn es darum geht, die Geschlechterungerechtigkeit am Arbeitsmarkt zu erklären. Bereits in diesem Zusammenhang hatten die Autoren gefolgert, dass es Zeit für eine Arbeitszeitneuverteilung ist – sowohl in der bezahlten, als auch in der unbezahlten Arbeit. Die neue Ausgabe des Equal Society Briefs knüpft an diese Frage an.


Politics: From Vision to Action

Barandat* *Defense Information Systems Agency*

DISA’s Security Technical Implementation Guides explain very specifically how computing devices should be configured to maximize security.
Today, there are more than 400 STIGs, each describing how a specific application, operating system, network device or smartphone should be configured.

If you look at any best practice guidance, regulation or standards around effective IT security out on the market today, you will see that it advises organizations to ensure their computing systems are configured as securely as possible and monitored for changes.

To many, the Security Technical Implementation Guides from the Defense Information Systems Agency represent a questionable exercise in compliance. Yet the STIGs play a real and important role in helping prevent cyber attacks for both the federal government and commercial organizations.

The DISA STIGs comprise a library of documents that explain very specifically how computing devices should be configured to maximize security. Today, there are over 400 STIGs, each describing how a specific application, operating system, network device or smartphone should be configured. The Windows 2008 STIG, for example, defines the sort of message users should receive when they log into their systems, the minimum password length allowed for any user and how often users must change their passwords…..


Unvollständige Übersicht: Zur Zeit vergessene Hotspots

Während in der Sicherheits- und Verteidigungspolitik hierzulande die aktuellen Themen G36, A400M-Crash, Migranten im Mittelmeer und Libyen sowie das Verhältnis zu Russland die Debatte(n) bestimmen, geraten einige andere, längst nicht erledigte Hotspots trotz ihrer – relativen – Bedeutung für Europa völlig in den Hintergrund. So laufen halt öffentliche Debatten; dennoch eine – notwendigerweise unvollständige – Übersicht auf ein paar andere Problemfelder:

• Afghanistan

Al Jazeera hat eine recht sehenswerte Dokumentation über Afghanistan’s Billion Dollar Drug War online gestellt (Video oben; der Direktlink:

Das Afghanistan Analysts Network hat ein Themendossier zur Lage rund um Kundus in Nordafghanistan zusammengestellt. (Was wurde übrigens aus der jüngsten Großoffensive der Taliban und der angekündigten Gegenoffensive?)

• Jemen

Im Jemen bleibt die Lage weiterhin völlig unübersichtlich – hat die von Saudi-Arabien geführte Koalition nun eine Waffenruhe verkündet, oder gehen die Luftangriffe weiter? Jedenfalls, darauf deuten zahlreiche Berichte hin, gelang es den Huthi-Rebellen, ein F16-Kampfflugzeug der marokkanischen Luftwaffe abzuschießen:

@HamedGhaleb Yemen tribesmen with pics of Moroccan f-16 fighter in #Sadaa #Yemen #Morocco

— Nasser Atta (@nasseratta5) May 11, 2015

• Süd-Sudan

Im Süd-Sudan (wo übrigens auch die Bundeswehr mit derzeit 16 Soldaten an der UN-Mission UNMISS beteiligt ist) gibt es weitere heftige Kämpfe im Norden, die die Vereinten Nationen dazu gezwungen haben, ihre Hilfsbemühungen einzustellen. Von AFP:

Over 300,000 South Sudanese civilians are without “life saving aid” in the northern battleground state of Unity, the United Nations said Monday, as it and aid agencies pulled out due to heavy fighting.
“Ongoing hostilities in Unity state have now obliged all non-governmental organisations and UN agencies to evacuate staff from Leer and other locations,” UN aid chief in South Sudan Toby Lanzer said in a statement.
“As a consequence, over 300,000 civilians who are in need of emergency relief, including food aid and medical services, do not currently have access to such life-saving assistance.”

Al Jazeera hatte sich bereits am Sonntag South Sudan’s forgotten crisis gewidmet.

Welche Hotspots so rund um Europa, die nicht im Fokus stehen, habe ich noch vergessen?

Nachtrag: Da wird in den Kommentaren ja schon einiges genannt, woran ich oben nicht gedacht habe… Um zum Teil mal nachzuliefern:


Defense One: What Have 9 Months of Airstrikes Against ISIS Achieved?

There’s no end in sight for an air campaign that has killed some 8,500 militants and cost more than $2 billion.

Guardian: Scale of UK attacks on Islamic State in Iraq revealed

British aircraft and unmanned drones have attacked Islamic State targets in Iraq with more than 200 bombs and missiles in military operations that have been largely ignored, a Guardian analysis shows.
The air strikes, which began in the autumn, have been undertaken by the RAF’s oldest bombers – Tornado GR4s and its newest weapon – the remotely piloted Reaper.

Al Arabyia: ISIS publishes manual on ‘How to Survive in the West’


ZDF-Magazin "Frontal 21": G36 von Anfang an "nicht truppenverwendbar"
Schon 1994 Probleme erkennbar / Insider packen aus
Das Standardgewehr der deutschen Soldaten, das G36, soll schon vor Einführung bei der Bundeswehr technische Probleme gehabt haben. Das berichtet der ehemalige Waffenkontrolleur des Beschaffungsamtes der Bundeswehr (BWB), Dieter Jungbluth, im ZDF-Magazin "Frontal 21" am Dienstag, 19. Mai 2015, 21.00 Uhr: "Schon im Erprobungsbericht von 1994 habe ich festgestellt, dass die Waffe nach nur 30 Schuss wegen der Temperatur ein erhebliches Problem bei der Treffsicherheit hat."

Bei seinen Recherchen stieß Jungbluth damals auf weitere Schwachstellen des von Heckler & Koch hergestellten Gewehres: "Das Kunststoffgehäuse nimmt nach vier Jahren Feuchtigkeit auf, dadurch quillt es auf und verliert an Präzision." Zudem habe es Probleme mit dem Sicherheitsmanöverpatronengerät gegeben, so Jungbluth weiter. "Es ist gerissen, hat sich von der Mündung gelöst und ist den Soldaten um die Ohren geflogen. Dadurch besteht sogar Lebensgefahr."

Das G36 war in einem ersten Vergleichstest, ebenfalls im Jahr 1994, als "nicht truppenverwendbar" bezeichnet worden. Testsieger wurde damals das Konkurrenzgewehr Steyr AUG aus Österreich mit dem Prädikat "truppenverwendbar". Die Beschaffer der Bundeswehr entschieden sich dennoch für das G36 und kauften bis heute rund 180 000 Gewehre dieses Typs.

Auf Nachfrage von "Frontal 21" erklärt Heckler & Koch, dass sich der hier zitierte Bericht auf einen Vorserien-Konstruktionsstand des HK50/G36 beziehe und nicht auf das von der Bundeswehr schließlich angeschaffte Sturmgewehr G36. Die damals geäußerten Beanstandungen bezögen sich primär auf ergonomische Aspekte und andere technische Detailmerkmale, die dann beim tatsächlich eingeführten Serien-Konstruktionsstand abgestellt beziehungsweise bereits berücksichtigt worden seien.

Michael Engesser, Geschäftsführer des Waffenherstellers Steyr Mannlicher, kritisiert dagegen die Entscheidung der Bundeswehr für das G36: "Wir haben mit einer vollfunktionsfähigen Waffe nach meinen Erfahrungen die Ausschreibung gewonnen und sind trotzdem vermutlich aus wirtschaftspolitischen Gesichtspunkten nicht zum Zug gekommen", erklärt Engesser gegenüber "Frontal 21". "Das kann nicht mit rechten Dingen zugegangen sein", kommentiert Jan van Aken, Verteidigungspolitiker der Linken, den Vorgang: "Ich glaube, schon damals war im Ministerium eine Art Seilschaft am Werk."

Der Waffenexperte Dieter Jungbluth erhebt schwere Vorwürfe gegen seine damaligen Vorgesetzten: "Man hat mich gemobbt und wollte mich für verrückt erklären lassen." Der Beamte wurde 2012 gegen seinen Willen in den Vorruhestand versetzt. Jungbluth klagt nun auf entgangene Bezüge und fordert eine Entschuldigung vom Dienstherrn, nachdem auch Bundesverteidigungsministerin Ursula von der Leyen (CDU) Probleme mit dem G36 eingeräumt hat. "Ich erwarte, dass meine Rehabilitierung durch die Ministerin korrekt erfolgt und damit mein Ansehen und meine Reputation wieder hergestellt wird."

Hinweis für Redaktionen:

Journalistische Nachfragen bitte unter Tel.: 030 – 2099-1254 (Michael Hölting)

Presse-Desk, Telefon: 06131 – 70-12108, pressedesk

Mainz, 19. Mai 2015
ZDF-Presse und Information


Briefing on the Eurasian Economic Union

Wednesday 10 June 2015, 1100 – 1200
RUSI, 61 Whitehall, London SW1A 2ET

RUSI is delighted to host Eurasian Economic Commission Minister Timur Suleimenov, who will share his views on the future of the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU).

The EAEU was ratified in January 2015, building on the economic foundations formed under the Customs Union between Kazakhstan, Russia and Belarus. This regional trading bloc, first proposed in 1994, has expanded from its orignal three members to also include Armenia and soon Kyrgyzstan. The shifting political and economic landscapes within the members states and the broader Eurasian region will lead to discussions on the future shape and characteristics of the EAEU as well as highlighting new challenges it will need to address and adapt to.

The briefing will also feature opening remarks by His Excellency Erzhan Kazykhanov, Ambassador of the Republic of Kazakhstan to the United Kingdom.


MAY 19, 2015

EIA launches redesigned International Energy Portal

Source: U.S. Energy Information Administration, International Energy Portal

04-30-15- 263503269-Marxism-in-the-Post-Globalization-Era.pdf
05-15-15 1_ESB_02_Zeit fr Familie und Beruf -Was Mtter und Vter wollen.pdf