Massenbach-Letter: NEWS 10/04/15

Massenbach-Letter. News

· The AIIB Is a Threat to Global Economic Governance

· U.S. Dep. of State: Parameters for a Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action Regarding the Islamic Republic of Iran’s Nuclear Program * Saudi king hopes Iran deal will strengthen world security * Kurds in the new Shiite-Sunni game * Russia Nervously Eyes the U.S.-Iran Deal * G.O.P. Senator, Bob Corker, Is Key Player in Iran Accord

· Putins Männer: Oligarchen gibt es in Russland nicht mehr

· Tomassoni (Senate Minnesota) urges Volkswagen to move to Minnesota

· Autism and the Future of Work: Unlocking the Genius From Within

Massenbach* Tomassoni (Senate Minnesota) urges Volkswagen to move to Minnesota

ST. PAUL — Anti-union rhetoric from Tennessee lawmakers led to Sen. David Tomassoni, DFL-Chisholm, sending an open letter to Volkswagen’s president and CEO urging the company to move operations to Minnesota.

The letter was in response to remarks about the automaker’s expansion plans in Tennessee and was co-signed by fellow lawmaker Rep. Carly Melin, Department of Employment and Economic Development (DEED) Commissioner Katie Clark Sieben and Iron Range Resources and Rehabilitation Board (IRRRB) Commissioner Mark Phillips.

The struggle to organize a United Auto Workers (UAW) union at Volkswagen’s Chattanooga, Tenn., plant is what spurred the letter, according to a release.

UAW has historically struggled to unionize at Asian- and German-owned assembly plants in the South. Resistance was met in Chattanooga as well, with state and national legislators from Tennessee threatening to cancel incentives promised to Volkswagen if a majority of the 3,200 workers at the plant voted to organize the UAW union.

UAW was certified in December as representing at least 45 percent of the workers in Chattanooga, which led to the group meeting regularly with management starting in January.

Other smaller groups of workers that opposed the UAW unionization are also able to meet with management if they make up 15 or 30 percent of workers.

For its part, news reports on the issue have described Volkswagen as seeing unions as more of a partner than an adversary.

The unique, complicated situation spurred Tomassoni to call on Volkswagen to consider the strong union environment of Minnesota.

Other benefits of the move highlighted by Tomassoni include Minnesota’s strong business environment and an abundance of natural resources to help assist with logistics.

“When I hear state lawmakers voicing serious concerns about a company that is bringing jobs to an area — simply because they do not like union labor — I feel the need to speak up,” he stated in the release. “Last year around this time Tennessee lawmakers attempted to hold business incentives hostage if a unionizing effort was passed. This time around those lawmakers are doing more of the same.”

He said Minnesota has proven itself as a great home for businesses, noting the current unemployment rate of 3.7 percent and a budget surplus of $1.89 billion. He also pointed out that this state is home to 20 Fortune 500 companies.

“We would be happy to welcome Volkswagen to the Land of 10,000 Lakes,” he added.

Tomassoni had reached out to Volkswagen in February 2014 as workers in Chattanooga were voting on joining the UAW.

About Tomassoni:

David Joseph "Dave" Tomassoni (born December 5, 1952) is a Minnesota politician and member of the Minnesota Senate. A member of the Minnesota Democratic–Farmer–Labor Party (DFL), he represents District 6, which includes portions of Itasca and St. Louis counties in the northeastern part of the state.


Deutsche Bank Research: Europas Populisten im Profil: Strukturen, Stärken, Potenziale

Populistische Parteien gewinnen in den Ländern Europas an Bedeutung. Ihre Profile sind zwar grundverschieden, Einigkeit besteht jedoch in der Ablehnung weiterer Schritte der europäischen Integration. Trotz der Erfolge auf nationaler Ebene ist auf europäischer Ebene bislang kein nennenswerter Einfluss EU-skeptischer Parteien zu verzeichnen. Dennoch könnten populistische Kräfte mit ihrer Blockadehaltung insbesondere in Politikfeldern, die einen breiten Konsens erfordern, künftig Europapolitik gestalten: Etablierte Parteien könnten sich nämlich gezwungen sehen, einen Kurs einzuschlagen, der stärker auf vermeintlich nationale Interessen ausgerichtet ist. Dies könnte dazu führen, dass Reformen nicht rechtzeitig und in vollem Umfang umgesetzt werden und die notwendige institutionelle Weiterentwicklung der Eurozone blockiert wird.


Policy= res publica

Freudenberg-Pilster* Autism and the Future of Work: Unlocking the Genius From Within

“Your child is on the autism spectrum.” Whenever these words ring in a parent’s head, a sense of hopelessness overcomes them. What will the world be like for my child? Will she ever be fully accepted outside of the home? Will he ever become fully self-sufficient when he grows up? Will she find love, get married, and have a family? More important, will there be any good job opportunities?

Every year, approximately 36,500 of every 4 million children born in the United States are diagnosed with autism. And over the lifetime of each patient, it can cost parents upwards of $2.4 million, including special care and education for the child and lost career opportunities for parents. Meanwhile, 85% of autistic adults are jobless or underemployed.

But it doesn’t have to be that way. For many companies this year on April 2, World Autism Awareness Day will be more than just wearing blue, raising money, and paying lip service. Rather, they’re seizing the unique talents of these individuals to spark more innovation from people who are outside the mainstream.

SAP: Celebrating World Autism Awareness Day every day with Autism at Work

We’ve all read some amazing stories about children, teenagers, and even adults with autism who are gifted with a natural talent that could change how we look at the world. As Chief Diversity & Inclusion Officer for SAP, I am thrilled that we have taken notice of their potential to be game changers.

At SAP, we are one of the first companies worldwide to be recruiting and hiring new employees on the spectrum. In a partnership with Specialisterne, a social business based in Denmark focused on helping people with autism find employment, SAP rolled out its Autism at Work initiative to help shift attitudes towards autism and inspire change.

According to Thorkil Sonne, the founder of Specialisterne, this initiative means that individuals on the spectrum can enter the world and know that they’re valuable. “A lot of people with disabilities have very low self-esteem, which comes from being reminded all the time of everything you’re not good at. Many people with autism find their self-esteem from what they do and not who they are in their social networks,” he says.

The Future of Work and Autism: A new competitive advantage

For SAP, Autism at Work quickly became more than just a feel-good, social responsibility program. Rather, it’s serving as an opportunity to employ talented people with a set of hard-to-find abilities that is offering a distinct competitive advantage, such as intelligence and memory, the ability to see patterns, and attention to detail.

However, an initiative like this is about much more than competitive advantage and gainful employment. It’s also about broadening the definition of workplace diversity and inclusion. Ari Ne’eman, president of the Washington DC-based Autistic Self Advocacy Network (ASAN) and a member of the U.S. National Council on Disability, comments, “We need to see neurological diversity in much the same way as we’ve seen workplace diversity efforts in the past on the basis of race, gender, and sexual orientation.”

By acknowledging and embracing this condition and the potential it promises, companies stand to gain skills that cannot be found anywhere else. Jose Velasco, Global Co-Lead of the program at SAP and father of two autistic children, believes in the importance of training all employees of the Future of Work. “We need to be aware that this condition exists, and it is in the best benefit of the company to employ people that bring this type of skill set.”

How will your business celebrate World Autism Awareness Day on April 2 – and every day after that? Use #LIUB to share your experience and join us as we light the world up in blue this April.

Anka Wittenberg is Chief Diversity & Inclusion Officer at SAP.


Politics: From Vision to Action

Barandat* STRATFOR: Russia Nervously Eyes the U.S.-Iran Deal*

When a group of weary diplomats announced a framework for an Iranian nuclear accord last week in Lausanne, there was one diplomat in the mix whose feigned enthusiasm was hard to miss. Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov left the talks at their most critical point March 30, much to the annoyance of U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry, who apparently had to call him personally to persuade him to return. Even as Lavrov spoke positively to journalists about the negotiations throughout the week, he still seemed to have better things to do than pull all-nighters for a deal that effectively gives the United States one less problem to worry about in the Middle East and a greater capacity to focus on the Russian periphery.

Russia has no interest in seeing a nuclear-armed Iran in the neighborhood, but the mere threat of an unshackled Iranian nuclear program and a hostile relationship between Washington and Tehran provided just the level of distraction Moscow needed to keep the United States from committing serious attention to Russia’s former Soviet sphere.

Russia tried its best to keep the Americans and Iranians apart. Offers to sell Iran advanced air defense systems were designed to poke holes in U.S. threats to bomb Iranian nuclear facilities. Teams of Russian nuclear experts whetted Iran’s appetite for civilian nuclear power with offers to build additional power reactors. Russian banks did their part to help Iran circumvent financial sanctions. The Russian plan all along was not to help Iran get the bomb, but to use its leverage with a thorny player in the Middle East to get the United States into a negotiation on issues vital to Russia’s national security interests. So, if Washington wanted to resolve its Iran problem, it would have to pull back on issues like ballistic missile defense in Central Europe, which Moscow saw early on as the first of several U.S. steps to encircle Russia.

Things obviously did not work according to the Russian plan. As we anticipated, the United States and Iran ultimately came together in a bilateral negotiation to resolve their main differences. Now the United States and Iran are on a path toward normalization at a time when Russian President Vladimir Putin is trying simultaneously to defend against a U.S.-led military alliance building along Russia’s European frontier and to manage an economic crisis and power struggle at home. And the situation does not look any better for Russia on the energy front.

Russia Stands to Lose Energy Revenue

The likelihood of the United States and Iran reaching a deal this summer means that additional barrels of Iranian oil eventually will make their way to the market, further depressing the price of oil, as well as the Russian ruble. To be clear, Iranian oil is not going to flood the market instantaneously with the signing of a deal. Iran is believed to have as much as 35 million barrels of crude in storage that it could offload quickly once export sanctions are terminated by the Europeans and eased by the United States via presidential waiver. But Iran will face complications in trying to bring its mature fields back online. Enhanced recovery techniques to revive mothballed fields take money and infrastructure, which is difficult to apply when oil prices are hovering around $50 per barrel. Under current conditions, Iran can bring some 400,000-500,000 barrels per day back online over the course of a year, but this will be a gradual process as Iran vies for foreign investment in its dilapidated energy sector.

U.S. investors will likely remain shackled by the core Iran Sanctions Act until at least the end of 2016, when the legislation is set to expire. However, European and Asian investors will be among the first to begin repairing Iran’s oil fields, as long as Iran does its part in improving contractual terms and the economics make sense for firms already cutting back their capital expenditures.

Europe’s New Options

The rehabilitation of Iran’s energy sector, however gradual a process that may be, will complicate Russia’s uphill battle in trying to maintain its energy leverage over Europe. Russia is a critical supplier of energy to Europe, currently providing about 29 percent and 37 percent of Europe’s natural gas and oil needs, respectively. An additional 50 billion cubic meters of natural gas available for export from the United States within the next five years will not be able to compete with Russia on price due to the low operational and transport costs of Russian natural gas. Even so, the United States will still be creating more supply in the natural gas market overall to give Europe the option of paying more for its energy security should the political considerations outweigh the economic cost. The Baltic states are already working toward this option, with Lithuania taking the lead in creating a mini-liquefied natural gas hub for the region to try to reduce, if not eliminate, Baltic dependence on Russia. This year, Poland is debuting its own LNG facility, and the Sabine Pass terminal in Louisiana is scheduled to bring the first LNG exports from the Lower 48 to market, with shipments already contracted for Asia.

In Southern Europe, the picture for Russia is more complicated but still distressing. Aside from the significant issue of cost for energy companies already cutting their capital expenditures, Turkey’s veto on the transit of LNG tankers through the Bosporus effectively neutralizes any LNG import facility project on the Black Sea. But Europe is proceeding apace with the much more economically palatable option of building pipeline interconnectors across southeastern Europe. This does little to dilute Russia’s control over energy supply, but it does strip Moscow of its ability to politicize pricing in Europe. Pipeline politics in Europe have allowed Russia to reward — and punish — its Eastern European neighbors through pricing contracts. However, Brussels is more thoroughly examining contracts signed by EU member states for this very reason and in line with one of the main tenets of the EU’s Third Energy Package, which seeks to break monopolies by splitting energy production and transmission and to implement fair pricing. Meanwhile, the construction of interconnectors allows member states to influence pricing downstream from Russia.

This gambit has been on display over the past year in Ukraine. Kiev depended heavily on its neighbors in Slovakia, Poland and Hungary for reverse flows of Russian natural gas at discounted rates to stand up to Russia’s energy swaggering. Though Russian natural gas will still be flowing primarily through these pipelines, the expansion of interconnectors will open up options for non-Russian natural gas from the North Sea and from LNG terminals in Northern Europe to make their way southward to embattled frontline states such as Ukraine.

Russia thought it would be able to keep a hook in Southern Europe through the construction of South Stream, a mammoth pipeline project with a $30 billion price tag and 63-bcm capacity that sought to cut Ukraine out of the equation by moving natural gas across the Black Sea and through the Balkans and Central Europe. The combination of plunging energy prices and growing EU resistance to another pipeline that would allow Russia to draw political favors sent this project to the graveyard, but Russia had a backup plan. The Turkish Stream pipeline would make landfall in Turkey after crossing the Black Sea, before using the Trans Adriatic Pipeline and the Trans Anatolian Pipeline to feed Southern Europe through the web of interconnectors and pipelines already in development. On the surface, Moscow’s plan appears quite brilliant: Use the very infrastructure that Europe was already counting on to diversify away from Russia and then, when the political skirmishing over Ukraine eventually settles down, reinsert itself into Europe’s energy mix via a willing partner like Turkey.

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But the plan remains full of holes. Someone needs to pay for the main pipeline expansion between Russia and Turkey, and both countries will struggle to find private investors in this geopolitical and pricing climate. Moreover, there is no indication that the Europeans will be willing to take additional Russian natural gas from a yet-to-be-built Turkish Stream when a perfectly good pipeline running from Russia to Eastern Europe already exists. Russia does not have the option of refusing natural gas shipments when it is already desperate for those energy revenues. In the end, this is a Russian bluff that the Europeans will not be afraid to call. When Putin agreed to a three-month natural gas deal with Ukraine last week (with a huge discount to boot, at $247.20 per thousand cubic meters), he likely did so realizing that Russia playing hardball with Ukraine on energy would only spur further investment and construction into pipelines and connectors in southeastern Europe that would accelerate the decline of Russia’s energy influence in Europe. The best he can hope for is to slow that timeline down.

Not only will Russia’s pricing leverage wane in Europe over the long term, but its influence on Europe’s energy supply also will decrease over the longer run. Azerbaijan was the first southern corridor supplier to Europe circumventing Russia and is now expanding that role by bringing natural gas from its Shah Deniz II offshore fields online for export. Turkmenistan is still vulnerable to Russian meddling but has been increasingly willing to host Turkish and European investors looking to build a pipeline across the Caspian to feed Europe. Whether these talks translate into action will depend on the Turkmen government’s political will to stand up to Moscow, not to mention legal battles over the Caspian Sea. But while the lengthy courting of Ashgabat by the West continues, a rehabilitated Iran is now the latest addition to the list to join the southern corridor.

Russia’s Influence Wanes in the Middle East

Just a day after the Iranian nuclear framework deal was announced, Russia’s state-owned RIA Novosti published a story quoting Igor Korotchenko, the head of the Moscow-based Center for Analysis of World Arms Trade, as saying it would be a "perfectly logical development" for Russia to follow through on a sale of S-300 surface-to-air missiles to Iran if the embargo is lifted. Korotchenko noted that specifications to the deal would have to be made as "the United States is watching very closely" to whom Russia sells these weapons. Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Ryabkov also made a point to say the U.N. arms embargo against Iran should be lifted as part of the nuclear deal. These well-timed statements likely caught Washington’s eye but probably did little to impress. The S-300 threat mattered a lot more when the United States needed to maintain a credible military deterrent against Iran. If the United States and Iran reach an understanding that neutralizes that threat through political means, Russian talk of S-300s is mostly hot air.

This was a small, yet revealing illustration of Russia’s declining position in the Middle East. For many years, the Middle East was a rose garden for the Russians, filled with both sweet-smelling opportunities to lure Washington into negotiations and ample thorns to prick their American adversary when the need arose. Russia’s support for the Syrian government is still relevant, and Moscow will continue to court countries in the region with arms deals out of both political and economic necessity. Even so, bringing down the Syrian government is not on Washington’s to-do list, and countries like Egypt will still end up prioritizing their relationship with the United States in the end.

Russia’s influence in the Middle East is fading rapidly at the same time Europe is starting to wriggle out of Russia’s energy grip. And as Russia’s options are narrowing, U.S. options are multiplying in both the Middle East and Europe. This is an uncomfortable situation for Putin, to be sure. But a narrow set of options for Russia in its near abroad does not make those options any less concerning for the United States as the standoff between Washington and Moscow continues.


Putins Männer: Oligarchen gibt es in Russland nicht mehr

….Wie ist es heute? Im Jahr 15, in dem Wladimir Putin Russland regiert? Auch wenn es wie Kreml-Propaganda klingt: Oligarchen gibt es heute nur noch in der Ukraine. Dort haben einige Superreiche das Land unter sich aufgeteilt. Einer von ihnen, Petro Poroschenko, ist zum Präsidenten gewählt worden. Keine guten Aussichten für ein Land, das angegriffen wurde und kurz vor der Pleite steht. In Russland ist das anders. Es gibt dort keine Oligarchen mehr. Denn ein Oligarch ist ein Wirtschaftsmagnat, der durch seinen Reichtum politische Macht ausübt. Damit aber haben Wladimir Putin und seine Leute aus den Geheimdiensten, die aus dem sowjetischen KGB hervorgingen, Schluss gemacht – nach und nach, aber mit großer Zielstrebigkeit.

Keine Kleptokratie in Russland

Doch Putins Mannschaft ist keine Truppe von Staatsoligarchen, denen es nur um die Pfründe geht. Oder wie es der bulgarische Politologe Ivan Krastev kürzlich sagte: „Man kann korrupt sein und gleichzeitig eine Mission haben. Wenn es nur darum ginge, sich zu bereichern, hätte der Kreml nicht die Krim annektiert. Wer schon ein paar Milliarden zusammengerafft hat, kann durchaus beginnen, sich Gedanken über seinen Platz in den Geschichtsbüchern zu machen.“

Es ist eine Fehlwahrnehmung des Westens, Putins Herrschaftssystem als Kleptokratie zu beschreiben, wie es die amerikanische Wissenschaftlerin Karen Dawisha kürzlich in einem aufsehenerregenden Buch getan hat. Die Sache ist ernster. Putin und seine Mannschaft glauben an eine Mission, an der sie seit Jahren festhalten und die sie mit großer Beharrlichkeit verfolgen. Sie wollen die russische Nation ideologisch erneuern auf der Grundlage des Nationalismus und der Orthodoxie. ….


Middle East

*U.S. Department of State: Parameters for a Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action Regarding the Islamic Republic of Iran’s Nuclear Program*

Below are the key parameters of a Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) regarding the Islamic Republic of Iran’s nuclear program that were decided in Lausanne, Switzerland. These elements form the foundation upon which the final text of the JCPOA will be written between now and June 30, and reflect the significant progress that has been made in discussions between the P5+1, the European Union, and Iran. Important implementation details are still subject to negotiation, and nothing is agreed until everything is agreed. We will work to conclude the JCPOA based on these parameters over the coming months.


  • Iran has agreed to reduce by approximately two-thirds its installed centrifuges. Iran will go from having about 19,000 installed today to 6,104 installed under the deal, with only 5,060 of these enriching uranium for 10 years. All 6,104 centrifuges will be IR-1s, Iran’s first-generation centrifuge.
  • Iran has agreed to not enrich uranium over 3.67 percent for at least 15 years.
  • Iran has agreed to reduce its current stockpile of about 10,000 kg of low-enriched uranium (LEU) to 300 kg of 3.67 percent LEU for 15 years.
  • All excess centrifuges and enrichment infrastructure will be placed in IAEA monitored storage and will be used only as replacements for operating centrifuges and equipment.
  • Iran has agreed to not build any new facilities for the purpose of enriching uranium for 15 years.
  • Iran’s breakout timeline – the time that it would take for Iran to acquire enough fissile material for one weapon – is currently assessed to be 2 to 3 months. That timeline will be extended to at least one year, for a duration of at least ten years, under this framework.

Iran will convert its facility at Fordow so that it is no longer used to enrich uranium

  • Iran has agreed to not enrich uranium at its Fordow facility for at least 15 years.
  • Iran has agreed to convert its Fordow facility so that it is used for peaceful purposes only – into a nuclear, physics, technology, research center.
  • Iran has agreed to not conduct research and development associated with uranium enrichment at Fordow for 15 years.
  • Iran will not have any fissile material at Fordow for 15 years.
  • Almost two-thirds of Fordow’s centrifuges and infrastructure will be removed. The remaining centrifuges will not enrich uranium. All centrifuges and related infrastructure will be placed under IAEA monitoring.

Iran will only enrich uranium at the Natanz facility, with only 5,060 IR-1 first-generation centrifuges for ten years.

  • Iran has agreed to only enrich uranium using its first generation (IR-1 models) centrifuges at Natanz for ten years, removing its more advanced centrifuges.
  • Iran will remove the 1,000 IR-2M centrifuges currently installed at Natanz and place them in IAEA monitored storage for ten years.
  • Iran will not use its IR-2, IR-4, IR-5, IR-6, or IR-8 models to produce enriched uranium for at least ten years. Iran will engage in limited research and development with its advanced centrifuges, according to a schedule and parameters which have been agreed to by the P5+1.
  • For ten years, enrichment and enrichment research and development will be limited to ensure a breakout timeline of at least 1 year. Beyond 10 years, Iran will abide by its enrichment and enrichment R&D plan submitted to the IAEA, and pursuant to the JCPOA, under the Additional Protocol resulting in certain limitations on enrichment capacity.

Inspections and Transparency

  • The IAEA will have regular access to all of Iran’s nuclear facilities, including to Iran’s enrichment facility at Natanz and its former enrichment facility at Fordow, and including the use of the most up-to-date, modern monitoring technologies.
  • Inspectors will have access to the supply chain that supports Iran’s nuclear program. The new transparency and inspections mechanisms will closely monitor materials and/or components to prevent diversion to a secret program.
  • Inspectors will have access to uranium mines and continuous surveillance at uranium mills, where Iran produces yellowcake, for 25 years.
  • Inspectors will have continuous surveillance of Iran’s centrifuge rotors and bellows production and storage facilities for 20 years. Iran’s centrifuge manufacturing base will be frozen and under continuous surveillance.
  • All centrifuges and enrichment infrastructure removed from Fordow and Natanz will be placed under continuous monitoring by the IAEA.
  • A dedicated procurement channel for Iran’s nuclear program will be established to monitor and approve, on a case by case basis, the supply, sale, or transfer to Iran of certain nuclear-related and dual use materials and technology – an additional transparency measure.
  • Iran has agreed to implement the Additional Protocol of the IAEA, providing the IAEA much greater access and information regarding Iran’s nuclear program, including both declared and undeclared facilities.
  • Iran will be required to grant access to the IAEA to investigate suspicious sites or allegations of a covert enrichment facility, conversion facility, centrifuge production facility, or yellowcake production facility anywhere in the country.
  • Iran has agreed to implement Modified Code 3.1 requiring early notification of construction of new facilities.
  • Iran will implement an agreed set of measures to address the IAEA’s concerns regarding the Possible Military Dimensions (PMD) of its program.

Reactors and Reprocessing

  • Iran has agreed to redesign and rebuild a heavy water research reactor in Arak, based on a design that is agreed to by the P5+1, which will not produce weapons grade plutonium, and which will support peaceful nuclear research and radioisotope production.
  • The original core of the reactor, which would have enabled the production of significant quantities of weapons-grade plutonium, will be destroyed or removed from the country.
  • Iran will ship all of its spent fuel from the reactor out of the country for the reactor’s lifetime.
  • Iran has committed indefinitely to not conduct reprocessing or reprocessing research and development on spent nuclear fuel.
  • Iran will not accumulate heavy water in excess of the needs of the modified Arak reactor, and will sell any remaining heavy water on the international market for 15 years.
  • Iran will not build any additional heavy water reactors for 15 years.


  • Iran will receive sanctions relief, if it verifiably abides by its commitments.
  • U.S. and E.U. nuclear-related sanctions will be suspended after the IAEA has verified that Iran has taken all of its key nuclear-related steps. If at any time Iran fails to fulfill its commitments, these sanctions will snap back into place.
  • The architecture of U.S. nuclear-related sanctions on Iran will be retained for much of the duration of the deal and allow for snap-back of sanctions in the event of significant non-performance.
  • All past UN Security Council resolutions on the Iran nuclear issue will be lifted simultaneous with the completion, by Iran, of nuclear-related actions addressing all key concerns (enrichment, Fordow, Arak, PMD, and transparency).
  • However, core provisions in the UN Security Council resolutions – those that deal with transfers of sensitive technologies and activities – will be re-established by a new UN Security Council resolution that will endorse the JCPOA and urge its full implementation. It will also create the procurement channel mentioned above, which will serve as a key transparency measure. Important restrictions on conventional arms and ballistic missiles, as well as provisions that allow for related cargo inspections and asset freezes, will also be incorporated by this new resolution.
  • A dispute resolution process will be specified, which enables any JCPOA participant, to seek to resolve disagreements about the performance of JCPOA commitments.
  • If an issue of significant non-performance cannot be resolved through that process, then all previous UN sanctions could be re-imposed.
  • U.S. sanctions on Iran for terrorism, human rights abuses, and ballistic missiles will remain in place under the deal.


  • For ten years, Iran will limit domestic enrichment capacity and research and development – ensuring a breakout timeline of at least one year. Beyond that, Iran will be bound by its longer-term enrichment and enrichment research and development plan it shared with the P5+1.
  • For fifteen years, Iran will limit additional elements of its program. For instance, Iran will not build new enrichment facilities or heavy water reactors and will limit its stockpile of enriched uranium and accept enhanced transparency procedures.
  • Important inspections and transparency measures will continue well beyond 15 years. Iran’s adherence to the Additional Protocol of the IAEA is permanent, including its significant access and transparency obligations. The robust inspections of Iran’s uranium supply chain will last for 25 years.
  • Even after the period of the most stringent limitations on Iran’s nuclear program, Iran will remain a party to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), which prohibits Iran’s development or acquisition of nuclear weapons and requires IAEA safeguards on its nuclear program.


Saudi king hopes Iran deal will strengthen world security*….despite its private reservations, Riyadh has publicly backed the talks between Iran and world powers since they were announced in late 2013 so long as they led to a deal that would guarantee Tehran could not gain nuclear weapons.”


G.O.P. Senator, Bob Corker, Is Key Player in Iran Accord

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Texte von Uri Avnery

Apr 3, 2015

Wer fürchtet sich vor der bösen-Bombe?

04-07-15 Nuclear Deal Would Allow Iran to Boost Centrifuges After 10 Years – WSJ.pdf
04-07-15 Parameters for a Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action Regarding the Islamic Re.pdf
04-07-15 Translation of Iranian Fact Sheet on the Nuclear Negotiations _ Iran Matters.pdf
04-07-15 Russia Nervously Eyes the U.S.-Iran Deal _ Stratfor.pdf
04-07-15 G.O.P. Senator, Bob Corker, Is Key Player in Iran Accord – NYTimes.pdf
03-28-15 FAS – Wladimir Putins Mnner am Kreml in Russland.pdf