Massenbach-Letter: NEWS 10/10/14

Massenbach-Letter. News

*Herausgegeben von Udo von Massenbach, Bärbel Freudenberg-Pilster, Joerg Barandat*

Guten Morgen.

· In eigener Sache:„Neue Liberale“ Bundesparteitag

· Neue Zürcher Zeitung: Die Zukunft der Bundeswehr*Deutsche Bruchpiloten*

· Washington’s Secret Back-Channel Talks With Syria’s Kurdish ‚Terrorists‘

· New Times (opinion):”Pakistan’s Lessons for Turkey

· STRATFOR:Turkey, the Kurds and Iraq: The Prize and Peril of Kirkuk

·

· John Kemp: [SLIDE DECK] FUTURE OF ENERGY MARKETS TO 2035

· John Kemp: “..carbon capture costs…

· Youth unemployment in Europe: What employers and policy makers can do”

· International Union – UAW – Mercedes in Chattanooga, Tennessee

Massenbach* In eigener Sache:„Neue Liberale“ Bundesparteitag

Veröffentlicht am 07.10.2014: Ein kurzer Film über den Bundesparteitag der Neuen Liberalen in Hamburg, am 28.09.2014.

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Neue Zürcher Zeitung: Die Zukunft der Bundeswehr

*Deutsche Bruchpiloten*

Die stärkste Macht in der EU unterhält anscheinend eine Armee, die weder fahren noch fliegen oder schwimmen kann. Kampfflugzeuge mit Löchern, wo keine sein sollen; Schiffe, die falsch angestrichen wurden; Schützenpanzer, die Freund und Feind nicht auseinanderhalten können. In Deutschland tobt eine Diskussion, ob die Bundeswehr einsatzfähig ist oder ob sie eher jenem Ritter von der traurigen Gestalt gleicht, der in rostiger Rüstung in den Kampf zieht. Wie so oft, wenn sich die Bundesrepublik mit der ihr eigenen Gründlichkeit ihren Fehlern widmet, schiesst die Auseinandersetzung übers Ziel hinaus. Waffensysteme weisen zwar Mängel auf, sie sind veraltet, oder es fehlt an Ersatzteilen. Neuentwicklungen treffen erst Jahre nach dem vereinbarten Liefertermin bei der Truppe ein. Doch dies ist nur die halbe Wahrheit.

Leidensgeschichte eines Flugzeuges

Nicht die technischen und organisatorischen Unzulänglichkeiten sind skandalös, sondern allenfalls das Faktum, dass jene seit Jahren bekannt sind, ohne dass wirklich etwas geschehen ist. Ein Paradebeispiel ist das Transportflugzeug A400M, dessen Entwicklung eine Saga der Pannen und Verspätungen ist. Als Berlin dem Projekt um die Jahrtausendwende seinen Segen gab, war allen Kundigen klar, dass die Maschinen noch sehr lange nicht fliegen würden. Zu ambitioniert war anfangs der Anforderungskatalog für das Flugzeug, zu unerfahren der Hersteller im Bau militärischer Transporter. Den Ausschlag für Airbus gaben industriepolitische Argumente und der dringende Wunsch des damaligen Kanzlers Gerhard Schröder, Frankreich einen Gefallen zu erweisen. Rüstungskäufe sind eben keine «normalen» Beschaffungsvorhaben. In Deutschland, wo alle froh sind, wenn die Bundeswehr keine Schlagzeilen macht, geniessen militärische Projekte keine Priorität. Die Politik kümmert sich nicht darum, die Ministerialbürokratie erweist sich oft als überfordert. Ein anderes Beispiel ist das angejahrte Luftverteidigungssystem Patriot. Vier Koalitionsregierungen haben hierfür seit bald zwei Jahrzehnten vergeblich nach Ersatz gesucht.

Wer nichts macht, macht auch nichts falsch. Diesen bewährten Satz aller Bürokratien haben sich im Verteidigungsministerium auch die obersten Offiziere mit den goldenen Epauletten hinter die Ohren geschrieben. So hätten Kauf und Modifikation der Drohne Global Hawk nicht im Desaster und in einem Untersuchungsausschuss geendet, wenn sich die Verantwortlichen ermannt hätten, für den Betrieb eine Ausnahmebewilligung zu unterschreiben. Das hätte allerdings Mut erfordert, denn in Deutschlands paragrafenverliebten Streitkräften ist es ein Sakrileg, sich über Vorschriften hinwegzusetzen, seien sie auch so widersinnig wie regelmässige Abgastests für Geländeautos des Heeres in Afghanistan. Die Bundeswehr wirkt oft weniger als Armee denn als Rechtsabteilung mit angeschlossenen Militäreinheiten. Die Risikoscheu der Generale trifft auf eine politische Führung, die den Pazifismus der Gesellschaft fürchtet und unbequemen Entscheidungen deshalb aus dem Weg geht.

Es ist das Verdienst von Verteidigungsministerin Ursula von der Leyen, einige dieser Defizite offen anzusprechen. Allerdings hat die Bundeswehr trotz den Problemen stets ihre Auslandeinsätze bewältigt. Und es gibt keinen Hinweis, dass ausgerechnet jetzt die Einsatzfähigkeit durch die chronischen Gebresten ernsthaft gefährdet ist. Unklar ist hingegen, für welche Zwecke die Bundeswehr ihr teures Grossgerät einsetzen soll. Die Streitkräfte befinden sich im Umbruch. Ihre Präsenz in den beiden mit Abstand wichtigsten Stationierungsgebieten ist auf 1800 (Afghanistan) und 700 Mann (Kosovo) geschrumpft. Dies ist nur noch ein Bruchteil früherer Planungen: Demnach soll Deutschland bis zu 14 000 Soldaten gleichzeitig ins Ausland schicken können. Die Bundeswehr definiert sich als Einsatz-Armee, doch ihr gehen jetzt die Einsätze aus. Eine Handvoll Mini-Missionen in Afrika, eine Beobachtungsmission in der Ukraine oder ein Ausbildungszentrum im Nordirak sind kein Ersatz hierfür.

Zu geringes Engagement im Irak

Statt an möglichst vielen Orten ziemlich wenig zu tun, wäre es vermutlich sinnvoll, sich auf einige Einsätze zu konzentrieren. Dort sollte die Bundeswehr dann aber auch etwas bewirken wollen. So ist es kaum plausibel, warum Berlin zwar Waffen an die Kurden liefert, sich aber an den Luftangriffen nicht beteiligt. Auch die militärische Hilfe für die Ukraine könnte substanzieller ausfallen. Beide Schauplätze sind derzeit zentral für die deutschen Sicherheitsinteressen. Will man sich nach Afghanistan überhaupt noch an echten Kampfeinsätzen beteiligen und etwa gemeinsam mit Frankreich in Afrika Operationen durchführen? Es sieht nicht danach aus. Wichtiger, als die Löcher in Eurofighter-Jets zu zählen, wäre die Debatte, ob die Bundeswehr wieder auf die Stufe robuster Entwicklungshilfe zurückfallen soll. In Afghanistan waren die Streitkräfte schon einmal weiter.

http://www.nzz.ch/meinung/kommentare/deutsche-bruchpiloten-1.18400010

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Policy= res publica

Freudenberg-Pilster* IZA: “Youth unemployment in Europe: What employers and policy makers can do”

Posted on September 25, 2014 by Werner Eichhorst

Youth unemployment has become one of the most pressing and highly discussed issues in Europe in the aftermath of the 2008 recession. However, there is major divergence in youth unemployment rates across European countries with massive increases in Spain, Greece, Italy, Portugal and France. Some Central and Eastern European countries also report unemployment rates of more than one-third, while the situation is mostly stable in Germany, the Netherlands, Austria or Denmark.

However, youth unemployment rates are not the best indicators available, as the active share of the youth labor force varies greatly due to enrollment in upper secondary and tertiary education. Measuring youth exclusion via the NEET rates, i.e. the share of young people not in employment, education or training, shows lower values and more contained increases, but the cross-country divergence is also remarkable.

Cross-national differences highlight the crucial interaction of a macroeconomic shock with the institutional arrangement in place, and in fact youth (un)employment is one of the areas where institutions make a real difference. The recent crisis has once again highlighted the structural problems that already existed in better times. In general, there is a particular vulnerability at the early stage of labor market careers that is typical for young people in many countries. But institutions are crucial in structuring the transition from school or education to work. This holds for:

§ the regulation of employment protection (fixed-term vs. permanent contracts) that tends to create dual labor markets with very limited possibilities of a transition to stable jobs in many Mediterranean countries,

§ minimum wages which can be particularly harmful for young people without particular skills or work experience,

§ vocational training, where dual vocational training and apprenticeships appear superior to general education and purely school-based vocational education as the former combine structured learning with early work experience,

§ active labor market policies to deal with the prevention of (long-term) unemployment such as preparatory training, alternative curricula and subsidized forms of employment that are more or less effective in promoting a sustainable access to the labor market.

Countries with high or rising youth unemployment and NEET rates often lack institutional preconditions for a smooth transition from school to work. Youth-friendly labor markets are either flexible (with a low regulatory gap between permanent and temporary jobs, and moderate minimum wages) and/or they have strong vocational training that the raises attractiveness of labor market entrants to employers due to skills acquisition and work experience combined.

Recent initiatives in Europe to promote reforms in that direction are somewhat limited, however, because of the difficulties in implementing vocational training systems. The establishment of (dual) vocational training is one of the most difficult institutional innovations as it requires cooperation between government (training schedules, funding of vocational schools), social partners (committed to promoting vocational training and co-management of the system, including pay agreements), individual employers (hiring apprentices, providing work experience and training by qualified trainers), and, last but not least, young people and their families (accepting vocational training as a reasonable alternative to academic education). Where they exist at a relevant scale, these systems have major historical and societal foundations that are hard to transplant. However, existing regional or sectoral networks of employers could establish pragmatic versions of structured learning and joint schooling when there are shared interests and a critical mass of firms supporting it as well as backing by regional governments. Experiences with pilot projects, regional or sectoral clusters of employers or traditional apprenticeships can be instructive in this respect.

The main challenge is to make on-the-job learning more systematic and to bring school-based vocational training or general education closer to labor market needs. To achieve this, employer participation in more effective vocational training is crucial. Hence, ‘simplified’ versions of dual VET can work, bringing training closer to employers’ demand and real work experience. For example, if a number of employers in some region or sector are able to identify a joint interest in dual VET as a way to promote the productivity of their workforce, it could be realistic to start with a dual VET cluster, ideally with the support from the government who would need to take a supporting role with regard to the vocational schooling components. A basic agreement regarding funding, management and curricula could be a good starting point. Employers in countries with high youth unemployment do not only have a social responsibility, but they have to see that deficits in skill formation with young people will also harm their business performance in the future, particularly in a situation of demographic aging.

A lack of skill formation will certainly undermine future attempts at reviving economic activity. In the short run, and at the individual level, mobility to regions or countries with tight labor markets in order to find a job or an apprenticeship can be a beneficial response to avoid unemployment on the one hand and labor shortages on the other. But employers in countries with high unemployment are well advised to create better opportunities for young people as a means to ensure their own competitiveness. It could also make sense to collaborate across borders to ensure proper vocational training when it takes long to establish such capacities.

It must also be noted that youth unemployment cannot be overcome by targeted publicly sponsored active labor market policies, such as youth guarantees promoted within the EU. These measures require good targeting and well-established implementation capacities. This is particularly difficult in countries or regions with high youth unemployment. Rather, youth employment benefits from macroeconomic improvement and labor market institutions that are conducive to employment growth and labor mobility. Improving VET systems remains relevant even if structural and institutional changes need to interact with attempts to increase certain types of job opportunities.

But other elements maybe equally important in order to create labor market conditions that are more conducive to a smoother transition from school to work. In this context, along with the strengthening of vocational training, the highly dualized structure of labor markets observed in some countries such as Italy, Spain or France needs to be addressed. Where there is a strong divide between employment protection for permanent contracts on the one hand and the regulation of temporary contracts or self-employment on the other, young people typically get stuck in chains of fixed-term employment spells or other forms of flexible employment as employers are very reluctant to hire youths on a permanent basis, especially in the absence of vocational training.

Reducing the rigidity of dismissal protection while increasing employment security for labor market entrants according to tenure could be a solution, and practical work experience and training could then further ease the successful integration of young people into stable jobs. In this context, employers, while exposed to strong incentives to hire young people on a temporary basis, should definitely be aware of the long-term consequences of having a large segment of cheap and flexible labor force lacking specific skills. This might undermine more quality-oriented business models. Hence, stronger investment in skills via vocational training based on some cooperation between employers (and with other actors) can also help make permanent employment more attractive from the employers’ point of view.

This article also appeared in the World Commerce Review, September 2014.

Related posts in the IZA Newsroom:

§ Youth unemployment in Europe: key issues

§ Youth unemployment in Old Europe: The polar cases of France and Germany

§ The youth unemployment crisis: a fix that works and pays for itself

http://newsroom.iza.org/en/2014/09/25/youth-unemployment-in-europe-what-employers-and-policymakers-can-do/

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Politics: From Vision to Action

Barandat* *Washington’s Secret Back-Channel Talks With Syria’s Kurdish ‚Terrorists’*

OCTOBER 7, 2014 … State Department cables show how U.S. officials tried to both engage and undermine its Kurdish defenders …

the vastly outgunned People’s Protection Units (YPG), a Kurdish militia, are attempting to resist the weeks-long assault.

While Turkish troops watch from across the border and the U.S.-led air campaign continues, none of the powerful forces in the region have intervened decisively — leaving the YPG to face the jihadist advance on its own …

The United States has rejected formal relations with the Democratic Union Party (PYD), the party that is essentially the political wing of the YPG. The PYD, which has ruled Kobani and other Kurdish enclaves inside Syria since President Bashar al-Assad’s forces withdrew in July 2012, is affiliated with the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK), a militant organization that has fought Turkey since 1984 — and has consequently been listed as a terrorist organization by both Turkey and the United States.

But interviews with American and Kurdish diplomats show that Washington opened indirect talks with the PYD years ago, even as it tried to empower the group’s Kurdish rivals and reconcile them with the Free Syrian Army (FSA) …

The talks … are conducted through the U.S. Embassy in Paris … Concerns about a possible backlash from Ankara shaped Washington’s approach to the talks. "We had to be very careful because of the Turkish sensitivities” … Turks … knew about the contact and the messages going back and forth … they had their own direct contact underway with the PYD …

Washington tried to empower the Kurdish National Council (KNC), a fractious coalition of Syrian Kurdish parties backed by Iraqi Kurdish leader Massoud Barzani that has good relations with Turkey, as a counterweight to the PYD … KNC joined the Istanbul-based Syrian Opposition Coalition …

Although the KNC is backed by Barzani and his Turkish allies, the party was also harshly critical of Ankara and its support for Islamists within the Arab opposition … Turkey’s vision for Syria was a centralized "Islamist government" backed by a constitution "without mention of the Kurds," according to a KNC official …. By contrast, the KNC called for a decentralized Syrian state with guarantees for Kurdish rights … KNC officials were distrustful of Turkish support for the FSA …

The Americans also shared some of the Kurds‘ concerns about Turkey’s stance toward extreme Islamist factions … KNC officials approached the Americans with requests for assistance that would allow them to challenge the PYD as the preeminent force in Syria’s Kurdish areas … The KNC’s appeals for American support also came in the context of its struggle for influence with Islamist factions within the Syrian opposition … The Kurds needed to be involved in that, even if … PYD was fully representative of the Kurds … Since IS intensified its attacks on Kurdish areas, the PYD has requested Western military support … many experts are calling on Washington to reassess its stance toward Syrian Kurds … U.S. needs to accept that its best allies in the region are the Kurds. They are uniformly pro-Western, pro-secular, and are much more united in their fight against the radical Islamists than the Syrian opposition …

http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2014/10/07/washington_secret_back_channel_talks_with_kurdish_terrorists_turkey_syria_robert_ford_exclusive

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STRATFOR: Putin Seeks Solitude Amid Russia’s Perfect Storm*

Russian President Vladimir Putin celebrated his 62nd birthday Tuesday in a peculiar fashion: by himself in the Siberian forests. For the past few days, Putin’s spokesman, Dmitri Peskov, has brushed off journalists‘ questions about why the president decided not to celebrate his birthday in Moscow or do other work as he has in previous years. This is just another odd piece to an increasingly complex puzzle surrounding the stability and future of the Russian president and his government.

Current Instabilities

Russia is in the eye of the perfect storm. Though the crisis with Ukraine has been reduced to a simmer, Russia has seen a strategic reversal in its critical borderland. In addition, the crisis moved the West to enact sanctions on Russia and loosen many financial and economic ties to the country. Now the Kremlin is in the midst of an economic crisis that is every bit as serious as the Ukraine situation. In the past two days, Russia’s central bank used $1.6 billion of its currency reserves to shore up the Russian ruble. Since the start of 2014, the central bank has injected $51 billion in currency reserves to keep the currency stable. The Russian economy is projecting flat growth for 2014, while foreign investment into Russia has fallen by 50 percent. The Kremlin may have $630 billion in its reserves, but these funds are being used quickly in an attempt to fill the cracks.

Concerns over Russia’s financial stability have erupted into public battles between the various Kremlin factions. On Tuesday, Russian Finance Minister Anton Siluanov, a key figure in the liberal economic clans, publicly called on Putin to cut Russia’s ambitious defense spending program. Russia is set to start a 10-year, $770 billion defense rearmament program in 2015. Siluanov reportedly rejected the plan during recent budget drafts in September, prompting Putin to move decision-making on defense spending under his office and away from the Cabinet.

While Siluanov’s argument against defense spending is financial, Putin also has to consider the security and political ramifications of such a decision. Russia’s continued struggles in its borderlands will require a robust military. Moreover, Putin is using the defense budget to appease Russia’s various security and defense circles.

The Rise and Fall of Russian Leaders

Though Putin has ruled Russia for 15 years in a centralized and autocratic fashion, like any other leader he must balance various factions within the country. His ability to manipulate the various political clans is what brought him to power. The lack of that ability is what caused the downfall of Boris Yeltsin in the 1990s, and many leaders before him. Yeltsin was unable to manage the competition between his own loyalists, the more liberal circles of economists and the security and defense circles. Yeltsin wildly shifted policies in order to retain a grip on power, such as his economic shock policies and the restructuring of the Federal Security Services. Such erratic moves contributed to the Russian economic crash, the breakdown of the security services and the erosion of Russia’s military as it fought a savage war in the North Caucasus.

Yeltsin’s stumbling enabled Putin’s rise to power. Putin understood that a Russian leader could rule only as long as he could balance the competing groups. Putin is a former KGB agent, tying him into the security circles, while his knowledge of Russia’s need for Western technologies gives him an understanding of the more liberal economists. In his first years in power, Putin divided Russia’s assets and tools of power between the clans, keeping them in constant competition and positioning himself as the ultimate arbitrator.

The problem now is that the clan system has begun to crumble. The security circles are being blamed for failures in Ukraine, while the liberal economic circles are being blamed for the sour economy. Many personalities and groups are putting their own positions (and financial revenues) before the betterment of the state. Putin continues to try to maintain balance, as seen in the recent weeks of budget debates between the liberals and security circles. But Putin’s 15 years of success at balancing the clans came during times of rebuilding and resurging for Russia. Now, Putin is attempting to find balance from a position of weakness.

Putin’s grasp on power is not easy to gauge from outside the Kremlin. The decision for new leadership is made within the Kremlin walls, not among the people. Previous Russian leaders, from Nikita Khrushchev to Leonid Brezhnev to Yeltsin, were removed or pushed aside by the ones closest to them. Thus, it seems fitting that the current Russian leader chose to celebrate his birthday far from the Kremlin and its clans.

http://www.stratfor.com/geopolitical-diary/putin-seeks-solitude-amid-russias-perfect-storm#axzz3FbpYWzqz

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COLUMN-Efficiency, the invisible energy revolution: John Kemp

Future of Energy Markets 2015

The United States is experiencing the largest and most sustained drop in oil demand since the start of the petroleum era in 1859 thanks to improvements in efficiency and the switch to alternative fuels.

Quietly and almost unnoticed by most commentators, efficiency and fuel switching are making an even bigger contribution to the North American energy revolution than hydraulic fracturing and horizontal drilling.

Fuel savings have contributed more barrels to the supply/demand balance than the combined output from North Dakota’s Bakken and Texas’ Eagle Ford.

Efficiency gains and the switch from crude oil to natural gas and biofuels have cut the consumption of petroleum products in the United States by more than 2 million barrels per day since 2005, according to the Energy Information Administration.

If consumption is adjusted for the rise in population and economic output, oil use has actually fallen by between 3 and 4 million barrels per day compared with the previous trend ().

The plunge is a delayed response to the quadrupling of real oil prices since 1998 and especially after 2004, which sharpened the incentive for households, businesses and federal, state and local governments to change behaviour, enact conservation laws, and invest heavily in capital equipment designed to reduce oil consumption.

Many of the regulations and investments made in response to rising prices are still reducing oil demand today, even though prices have been steady for the last three years, and the efficiency drive is not over yet.

Vehicle efficiency standards and biofuel mandates will continue cutting petroleum consumption throughout the rest of the decade and into the 2020s even without a further rise in prices because they have been hardcoded into legislation and regulations.

Businesses have also become smarter at reducing fuel bills by optimising delivery and logistics systems, and those changes are unlikely to be reversed.

Similar lagged demand reductions are evident in Europe, leading many observers to conclude oil demand has peaked in the advanced industrial economies and that all future growth will come from the emerging economies.

Even bigger falls in consumption are possible in future if the gap between crude and natural gas prices in North America remains wide and encourages substantial switching from diesel to gas in road, rail and maritime transport.

LONG CYCLES

Demand reductions as much as increases in supply explain stable oil prices over the last four years and the evaporation of volatility.

However, this is not the first time demand has dropped; consumption fell after both the first and second oil shocks in 1973 and 1979.

Previous periods of demand destruction were followed by a drop in prices and a gradual recovery in consumption as memories faded and consumers reverted to more oil-intensive behaviour.

The question is whether this cycle is about to repeat itself. Will oil prices decline over the next few years, at least in real terms, sending the efficiency revolution into reverse?

Benchmark Brent prices have already slipped below $100 per barrel, a level some analysts thought would prove to be a floor, amid signs demand is anaemic and the market is oversupplied.

In theory, lower prices are the means to rebalance the market by slowing the pace of demand destruction, and perhaps even buying back some of the consumption that has been lost, as well as curbing rising supply.

Past experience suggests a period of weaker prices will be needed to stem the loss of demand and curtail the enormous amount of investment in new production which has been taking place in recent years (and is still occurring in many areas such as Russia, China and Argentina).

But prices might have to remain lower for longer than most producers have dared to admit if the market is to rebalance fully.

There are substantial amounts of extra shale oil that could be brought into production profitably at prices well under $100 per barrel which will keep supplies ample.

On the demand side, oil will continue to face stiff competition from cleaner burning and cheaper (at least in North America) natural gas.

Crucially, much of the demand destruction has been hardwired into the system in the form of efficiency regulations and mandates that will not easily be reversed.

Even if oil prices drift lower, governments in the advanced economies are unlikely to relax the push for because it is central to their climate change strategies.

In fact, advanced countries would likely oppose any resurgence in oil demand with additional taxes and regulations.

If some demand is bought back, it will have to be in developing economies rather than in North America and Western Europe.

John Kemp

Senior Market Analyst

Reuters

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Middle East

New Times (opinion):”Pakistan’s Lessons for Turkey

Last week, Turkey’s president, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, declared that Turkey is ready “for any cooperation in the fight against terrorism.” Prime Minister Ahmet Davutoglu argued that Islamic State militants pose a greater threat to Turkey and the Muslim world than to the West.

But Turkey’s dilemma is far more grave than its leaders realize. Indeed, Turkey’s current situation resembles the early years of Pakistan’s sponsorship of the Taliban. The Islamic State is recruiting militants in Turkey. And failure to clean its own house now could lead Turkey down the path of “Pakistanization,” whereby a resident jihadist infrastructure causes Sunni extremism to ingrain itself deeply within the fabric of society.

Although Turkey now recognizes the threat — the Turkish government voted to authorize military force in Iraq and Syria on Thursday — it has yet to come to terms with its own responsibility for helping to create it.

Turkey claims that radical groups grew stronger because moderates seeking the overthrow of President Bashar al-Assad of Syria were not given adequate aid. But that is not the whole picture. As Francis J. Ricciardone Jr., the former American ambassador to Turkey, has pointed out, Ankara supported radical groups, including the Nusra Front. Indeed, during the early days of Syria’s civil war, jihadist groups funneled fighters and resources through Turkey into Syria.

Turkey’s intervention in the Syrian civil war parallels Pakistan’s support of the Taliban to affect the course of the Afghan civil war. But the jihadism abetted by Pakistan did not remain across the Afghan border. Turkey may now be witnessing the beginnings of a similar blowback.

While the magnitude of Turkey’s recent engagement of jihadist proxies isn’t comparable to Pakistan’s long history of jihadist sponsorship, the late Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto’s ill-fated relationship with the Sunni extremists of Pakistan’s Deobandi movement is still instructive for Turkey. Pakistan’s Deobandis dedicated themselves to implementing “the system of the Caliphate of the Rightly Guided,” a Sunni sectarian state to serve as a South Asian stepping stone to a worldwide Islamic caliphate.

Pakistan’s experience with blowback began prior to Ms. Bhutto’s tenure, when General Zia ul-Haq’s regime backed mujahedeen militias as proxies to combat Soviet forces in Afghanistan. Organized by Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence directorate with assistance from the United States and Saudi Arabia, the recruitment networks within Pakistan started a radicalization process among segments of Pakistan’s population. The most susceptible group was the more than three million Afghan refugees. (The I.S.I. in particular backed Hekmatyar Gulbuddin’s Hezb-i-Islami, which was part of a rival to movement to the Deobandis.)

Afghan refugee boys began attending Deobandi madrassas, and small numbers of teachers and students began joining militant groups to fight the Soviets. Upon the Soviet withdrawal and the fall of the Afghan Communist government, the mujahedeen turned on one another, prolonging Afghanistan’s civil war, and the presence of millions of Afghan refugees in Pakistan.

In 1994, Ms. Bhutto began to abet militancy to secure Pakistani objectives in Afghanistan. The Bhutto government facilitated a paramilitary force of thousands of madrassa students to cross the border and take control of Afghanistan’s Kandahar Province. With Pakistan’s help, this militia of “Taliban,” literally “students,” conquered large swaths of Afghan territory and declared its commander, Mullah Omar, to be caliph. Like the Taliban before them, the Islamic State has designated its commander, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, as caliph and calls the territories under its control a caliphate.

Their militancy soon crossed the border. After the initial stage of mobilizing volunteers and weapons for jihad in Afghanistan, a second phase developed in which Pakistan witnessed a wave of anti-Shiite violence, including bombings of Karachi’s major Shiite mosques by the Taliban’s sister organization in Pakistan, Sipah-e Sahaba.

The Turkish government’s decision to turn a blind eye to Islamic State activity within its borders has similarly led to the extremists’ increasing influence in certain areas of Turkey’s major cities. The recent and unprecedented arson attacks on Shiite mosques in Istanbul may indicate that Turkey is entering this second phase. Turkey is home to only a small Shiite community; but Turkey’s Alevis, a heterodox Muslim sect often regarded as heretical by Sunnis, constitute about 20 percent of Turkey’s population.

A campaign by Sunni extremists against the Alevi community could lead Turkey into a Pakistan-like vortex of sectarian violence and radicalization. The present government’s own politics of polarization, illustrated by Mr. Erdogan’s baiting of the opposition leader Kemal Kilicdaroglu due to his Alevi background during Turkey’s recent presidential election campaign, may further inflame sectarian tensions. And Islamic State militants will not hesitate to exploit the Sunni-Alevi fault line in Turkish society.

Pakistan’s final and most dangerous stage of extremism occurred when the flow of militants and resources was reversed. As the Taliban conquered most of Afghanistan, it provided training camps and other logistical support to its allies, making it harder for Pakistan to control militant organizations inside its borders. After 9/11, Gen. Pervez Musharraf attempted to crack down on militants inside Pakistan. His efforts culminated in the 2007 Red Mosque battle in Islamabad and the subsequent coalescing of militants into the movement known as the Pakistani Taliban.

Turkey has not experienced this stage yet. But the Islamic State may find fertile recruiting ground among Turkey’s 1.3 million Syrian refugees. And Turkish citizens may be drawn into the orbit of militancy just as segments of Pakistan’s population have been. If the Islamic State’s Turkish networks remain intact, Turkey runs the risk that homegrown militants will be empowered by the return of fighters from Islamic State territory in Syria and Iraq.

Ms. Bhutto’s strategy of employing militant proxies to create a client state in Afghanistan succeeded — but at a high price for Pakistan. That is a warning for Turkey, which must recognize that it cannot shield itself from Sunni militancy while pursuing a Sunni sectarian foreign policy in the Middle East.

Michael M. Tanchum teaches at Tel Aviv University and is a fellow at the Harry S. Truman Institute at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem.Halil M. Karaveli is a senior fellow at the Central Asia-Caucasus Institute and the Silk Road Studies Program, which are affiliated with the School of Advanced International Studies at Johns Hopkins University and the Institute for Security and Development Policy in Stockholm.

http://www.nytimes.com/2014/10/06/opinion/pakistans-lessons-for-turkey.html?_r=3

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*Massenbach’s

Recommendation*

STRATFOR:Turkey, the Kurds and Iraq: The Prize and Peril of Kirkuk
By
Reva Bhalla

In June 1919, aboard an Allied warship en route to Paris, sat Damat Ferid Pasha, the Grand Vizier of a crumbling Ottoman Empire. The elderly statesman, donning an iconic red fez and boasting an impeccably groomed mustache, held in his hands a memorandum that he was to present to the Allied powers at the Quai d’Orsay. The negotiations on postwar reparations started five months earlier, but the Ottoman delegation was prepared to make the most of its tardy invitation to the talks. As he journeyed across the Mediterranean that summer toward the French shore, Damat Ferid mentally rehearsed the list of demands he would make to the Allied powers during his last-ditch effort to hold the empire together.

He began with a message, not of reproach, but of inculpability: "Gentlemen, I should not be bold enough to come before this High Assembly if I thought that the Ottoman people had incurred any responsibility in the war that has ravaged Europe and Asia with fire and sword." His speech was followed by an even more defiant memorandum, denouncing any attempt to redistribute Ottoman land to the Kurds, Greeks and Armenians, asserting: "In Asia, the Turkish lands are bounded on the south by the provinces of Mosul and Diyarbakir, as well as a part of Aleppo as far as the Mediterranean." When Damat Ferid’s demands were presented in Paris, the Allies were in awe of the gall displayed by the Ottoman delegation. British Prime Minister David Lloyd George regarded the presentation as a "good joke," while U.S. President Woodrow Wilson said he had never seen anything more "stupid." They flatly rejected Damat Ferid’s apparently misguided appeal — declaring that the Turks were unfit to rule over other races, regardless of their common Muslim identity — and told him and his delegation to leave. The Western powers then proceeded, through their own bickering, to divide the post-Ottoman spoils.

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Under far different circumstances today, Ankara is again boldly appealing to the West to follow its lead in shaping policy in Turkey’s volatile Muslim backyard. And again, Western powers are looking at Turkey with incredulity, waiting for Ankara to assume responsibility for the region by tackling the immediate threat of the Islamic State with whatever resources necessary, rather than pursuing a seemingly reckless strategy of toppling the Syrian government. Turkey’s behavior can be perplexing and frustrating to Western leaders, but the country’s combination of reticence in action and audacity in rhetoric can be traced back to many of the same issues that confronted Istanbul in 1919, beginning with the struggle over the territory of Mosul.

The Turkish Fight for Mosul

Under the Ottoman Empire, the Mosul vilayet stretched from Zakho in southeastern Anatolia down along the Tigris River through Dohuk, Arbil, Alqosh, Kirkuk, Tuz Khormato and Sulaimaniyah before butting up against the western slopes of the Zagros Mountains, which shape the border with Iran. This stretch of land, bridging the dry Arab steppes and the fertile mountain valleys in Iraqi Kurdistan, has been a locus of violence long before the Islamic State arrived. The area has been home to an evolving mix of Kurds, Arabs, Turkmen, Yazidis, Assyro-Chaldeans and Jews, while Turkish and Persian factions and the occasional Western power, whether operating under a flag or a corporate logo, continue to work in vain to eke out a demographic makeup that suits their interests.

At the time of the British negotiation with the Ottomans over the fate of the Mosul region, British officers touring the area wrote extensively about the ubiquity of the Turkish language, noting that "Turkish is spoken all along the high road in all localities of any importance." This fact formed part of Turkey’s argument that the land should remain under Turkish sovereignty. Even after the 1923 signing of the Treaty of Lausanne, in which Turkey renounced its rights to Ottoman lands, the Turkish government still held out a claim to the Mosul region, fearful that the Brits would use Kurdish separatism to further weaken the Turkish state. Invoking the popular Wilsonian principle of self-determination, the Turkish government asserted to the League of Nations that most of the Kurds and Arabs inhabiting the area preferred to be part of Turkey anyway. The British countered by asserting that their interviews with locals revealed a prevailing preference to become part of the new British-ruled Kingdom of Iraq.

The Turks, in no shape to bargain with London and mired in a deep internal debate over whether Turkey should forego these lands and focus instead on the benefits of a downsized republic, lost the argument and were forced to renounce their claims to the Mosul territory in 1925. As far as the Brits and the French were concerned, the largely Kurdish territory would serve as a vital buffer space to prevent the Turks from eventually extending their reach from Asia Minor to territories in Mesopotamia, Syria and Armenia. But the fear of Turkish expansion was not the only factor informing the European strategy to keep northern Iraq out of Turkish hands.

The Oil Factor

Since the days of Herodotus and Nebuchadnezzar, there have been stories of eternal flames arising from the earth of Baba Gurgur near the town of Kirkuk. German explorer and cartographer Carsten Niebuhr wrote in the 18th century: "A place called Baba Gurgur is above all remarkable because the earth is so hot that eggs and meat can be boiled here." The flames were in fact produced by the natural gas and naphtha seeping through cracks in the rocks, betraying the vast quantities of crude oil lying beneath the surface. London wasted little time in calling on geologists from Venezuela, Mexico, Romania and Indochina to study the land and recommend sites for drilling. On Oct. 14, 1927, the fate of Kirkuk was sealed: A gusher rising 43 meters (around 140 feet) erupted from the earth, dousing the surrounding land with some 95,000 barrels of crude oil for 10 days before the well could be capped. With oil now part of the equation, the political situation in Kirkuk became all the more flammable.

The British mostly imported Sunni Arab tribesmen to work the oil fields, gradually reducing the Kurdish majority and weakening the influence of the Turkmen minority in the area. The Arabization project was given new energy when the Arab Baath Socialist Party came to power through a military coup in 1968. Arabic names were given to businesses, neighborhoods, schools and streets, while laws were adjusted to pressure Kurds to leave Kirkuk and transfer ownership of their homes and lands to Arabs. Eviction tactics turned ghastly in 1988 under Saddam Hussein’s Anfal campaign, during which chemical weapons were employed against the Kurdish population. The Iraqi government continued with heavy-handed tactics to Arabize the territory until the collapse of the Baathist regime in 2003. Naturally, revenge was a primary goal as Kurdish factions worked quickly to repopulate the region with Kurds and drive the Arabs out.

Even as Kirkuk, its oil-rich fields and a belt of disputed territories stretching between Diyala and Nineveh provinces have remained officially under the jurisdiction of the Iraqi central government in Baghdad, the Kurdish leadership has sought to redraw the boundaries of Iraqi Kurdistan. After the Iraqi Kurdish region gained de facto autonomy with the creation of a no-fly zone in 1991 and then formally coalesced into the Kurdistan Regional Government after the fall of Saddam Hussein, Kurdish influence gradually expanded in the disputed areas. Kurdish representation increased through multi-ethnic political councils, facilitated by the security protection these communities received from the Kurdish peshmerga and by the promise of energy revenues, while Baghdad remained mired in its own problems. Formally annexing Kirkuk and parts of Nineveh and Diyala, part of the larger Kurdish strategy, would come in due time. Indeed, the expectation that legalities of the annexation process would soon be completed convinced a handful of foreign energy firms to sign contracts with the Kurdish authorities — as opposed to Baghdad — enabling the disputed territories to finally begin realizing the region’s energy potential.

Then the unexpected happened: In June, the collapse of the Iraqi army in the north under the duress of the Islamic State left the Kirkuk fields wide open, allowing the Kurdish peshmerga to finally and fully occupy them. Though the Kurds now sit nervously on the prize, Baghdad, Iran, local Arabs and Turkmen and the Islamic State are eyeing these fields with a predatory gaze. At the same time, a motley force of Iran-backed Shiite militias, Kurdish militants and Sunni tribesmen are trying to flush the Islamic State out of the region in order to return to settling the question of where to draw the line on Kurdish autonomy. The Sunnis will undoubtedly demand a stake in the oil fields that the Kurds now control as repayment for turning on the Islamic State, guaranteeing a Kurdish-Sunni confrontation that Baghdad will surely exploit.

The Turkish Dilemma

The modern Turkish government is looking at Iraq and Syria in a way similar to how Damat Ferid did almost a century ago when he sought in Paris to maintain Turkish sovereignty over the region. From Ankara’s point of view, the extension of a Turkish sphere of influence into neighboring Muslim lands is the antidote to weakening Iraqi and Syrian states. Even if Turkey no longer has direct control over these lands, it hopes to at least indirectly re-establish its will through select partners, whether a group of moderate Islamist forces in Syria or, in northern Iraq, a combination of Turkmen and Sunni factions, along with a Kurdish faction such as Kurdistan Regional Government President Massoud Barzani’s Kurdistan Democratic Party. The United States may currently be focused on the Islamic State, but Turkey is looking years ahead at the mess that will likely remain. This is why Turkey is placing conditions on its involvement in the battle against the Islamic State: It is trying to convince the United States and its Sunni Arab coalition partners that it will inevitably be the power administering this region. Therefore, according to Ankara, all players must conform to its priorities, beginning with replacing Syria’s Iran-backed Alawite government with a Sunni administration that will look first to Ankara for guidance.

However, the Turkish vision of the region simply does not fit the current reality and is earning Ankara more rebuke than respect from its neighbors and the West. The Kurds, in particular, will continue to form the Achilles‘ heel of Turkish policymaking.

In Syria, where the Islamic State is closing in on the city of Kobani on Turkey’s border, Ankara is faced with the unsavory possibility that it will be drawn into a ground fight with a well-equipped insurgent force. Moreover, Turkey would be fighting on the same side as a variety of Kurdish separatists, including members of Turkey’s Kurdistan Workers‘ Party, which Ankara has every interest in neutralizing.

Turkey faces the same dilemma in Iraq, where it may unwittingly back Kurdish separatists in its fight against the Islamic State. Just as critical, Turkey cannot be comfortable with the idea that Kirkuk is in the hands of the Iraqi Kurds unless Ankara is assured exclusive rights over that energy and the ability to extinguish any oil-fueled ambitions of Kurdish independence. But Turkey has competition. Iraqi President Jalal Talabani’s Patriotic Union of Kurdistan is not willing to make itself beholden to Turkey, as did Barzani’s Kurdistan Democratic Party, while financial pressures continue to climb. Instead, the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan is staying close to Iran and showing a preference to work with Baghdad. Meanwhile, local Arab and Turkmen resistance to Kurdish rule is rising, a factor that Baghdad and Iran will surely exploit as they work to dilute Kurdish authority by courting local officials in Kirkuk and Nineveh with promises of energy rights and autonomy.

This is the crowded battleground that Turkey knows well. A long and elaborate game of "keep away" will be played to prevent the Kurds from consolidating control over oil-rich territory in the Kurdish-Arab borderland, while the competition between Turkey and Iran will emerge into full view. For Turkey to compete effectively in this space, it will need to come to terms with the reality that Ankara will not defy its history by resolving the Kurdish conundrum, nor will it be able to hide within its borders and avoid foreign entanglements.

Editor’s Note: Writing in George Friedman’s stead this week is Reva Bhalla, vice president of Global Analysis.

http://www.stratfor.com/weekly/turkey-kurds-and-iraq-prize-and-peril-kirkuk#axzz3FOXSrneP

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COLUMN-Beyond Boundary Dam, carbon capture costs must come down: Kemp

(John Kemp is a Reuters market analyst. The views expressed are his own)

By John Kemp

LONDON Oct 2 (Reuters) – In a milestone for the carbon capture and storage (CCS) movement, SaskPower’s Boundary Dam power plant began making pipeline deliveries of liquid carbon dioxide (CO2) on Wednesday.

Boundary Dam Unit #3 is the first grid-scale coal-fired power plant in the world to be retrofitted with a CCS system. (www.saskpowerccs.com)

It marks an important step forward for a technology that policymakers have identified as essential to meeting climate change targets but which has so far remained mostly theoretical.

"CCS is the only known technology that will enable us to continue to use fossil fuels and also de-carbonise the energy sector," the chief of the International Energy Agency (IEA) said in a statement hailing the launch.

Capture systems have already been deployed at three industrial plants in the United States that produce hydrogen and fertiliser, as well as at the Great Plains Synfuels Plant, a lignite gasification facility just a few miles south of Boundary Dam in North Dakota. (www.dakotagas.com/)

But these projects produce relatively concentrated streams of carbon dioxide (CO2), which are easier and less expensive to capture.

By contrast, power plants such as Boundary Dam produce more diluted carbon dioxide emissions, which are correspondingly more expensive to process.

Carbon capture is also enormously energy-intensive. A significant share of the electricity generated is actually used within the plant to run the capture systems, which imposes a heavy penalty on its energy efficiency.

The central challenge is how to cut capture costs so that CCS can be deployed on a big enough scale to reduce global emissions.

CUTTING COSTS

Boundary Dam Unit #3 is a relatively small power plant, and retrofitting it with a CCS system has cost a lot of money.

SaskPower, which is owned by the Province of Saskatchewan, has invested almost C$1.3 billion ($1.2 billion) in the project since 2009. The capital investment includes a contribution of C$240 million from the government of Canada to help fund the demonstration project.

SaskPower was already committed to spending C$354 million to extend the life of the 45-year old generating unit for a further 30 years.

So the capital cost of the CCS retrofit and associated systems is therefore just under C$1 billion, which is expensive for a plant that will supply just 110 megawatts to the grid.

Boundary Dam Unit #3 has cost much more than the U.S. $350 million typical for an advanced coal-fired plant of its size, according to the U.S. Energy Information Administration.

First-of-a-kind (FOAK) systems are always expensive, but widespread commercial deployment will depend on getting CCS costs down by harnessing what is learned from such projects.

Policymakers and power industry executives will be watching Boundary Dam closely to see what lessons can be learned and how it can be done more cheaply in future.

"Experience from this plant will be critically important," the IEA observed. SaskPower claims its next carbon capture project will cost 30 percent less because of what it learned from Boundary Dam, but that remains an aspiration.

OIL RECOVERY

Saskatchewan has unique circumstances that make it favourable for CCS, which will not be easy to replicate elsewhere.

Boundary Dam is located in the city of Estevan, just 18 kilometres from the U.S. border, and lies in Williston Basin, which is also home to booming oil production from the Bakken shale and has always been an important source of lignite.

The province of Saskatchewan relies on coal to meet almost 50 percent of its power needs and has more than 300 years worth of lignite reserves.

Emissions regulations introduced by Canada’s federal government in 2011 for new coal-fired power plants and those that have reached the end of their useful life would have made it impossible to continue using lignite at Boundary Dam Unit #3 following the retrofit.

"Replacing coal would be a challenge," SaskPower says. "The loss of coal would not only cripple our ability to supply the province with the power that our lives demand, but would also have a severe economic impact on Estevan and Coronach as the coal-fired plants in those communities would need to shut down."

Boundary Dam can offset some of its higher capital and operating costs by selling some of the captured CO2 for injection into depleted oil fields in southern Saskatchewan for enhanced oil recovery (EOR).

The North Dakota Gasification Company has been selling CO2 from its Great Plains Synfuels Plant to enhance oil recovery at Saskatchewan’s Weyburn reservoir since 2000 and the nearby Midale reservoir since 2005. More than 22 million tonnes of CO2 have been successfully injected underground since the turn of the century.

In 2012, SaskPower concluded a long-term deal with Cenovus Energy, operators of the Weyburn field, to supply around 1 million tonnes of CO2 per year.

Other small quantities of CO2 will be injected nearly four kilometres underground at a site near Boundary Dam as part of a pilot programme called Aquistore to test CO2 storage in saline aquifers.

In the short and medium term, utilising CO2 for EOR is essential to improve the economics of any carbon capture and storage project.

In the longer term, however, the construction costs must come down substantially, and the CO2 must be captured using far less energy, if the CCS to fulfil the hopes that policymakers have placed in it. (1 US dollar = 1.1153 Canadian dollar)

http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/10/02/carboncapture-canada-kemp-idUSL6N0RX4ML20141002?feedType=RSS&feedName=everything&virtualBrandChannel=11563

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COLUMN-Carbon capture’s energy penalty problem: Kemp

Oct 6 (Reuters) – SaskPower’s Boundary Dam Unit #3, the first utility-scale power plant to be fitted with carbon capture and storage (CCS), has produced a surge in media interest since becoming operational this month.

But it also illustrates the formidable challenges that must be overcome before CCS is ready to play a significant role in the fight against climate change.

Refurbishing the 45-year old Unit #3 to extend its life for another 30 years and retrofitting it with equipment to capture carbon dioxide emissions has cost almost C$1.3 billion, according to the company’s accounts, about three times as much as a similar-sized plant without CCS.

SaskPower received $240 million from Canada’s government to help with construction costs and will realise additional revenues from the sale of CO2 to an enhanced oil recovery project. But the high capital costs of Unit #3 underscore how far away CCS remains from being competitive with conventional power stations or renewables such as wind and solar.

SaskPower insists that the lessons learned from building the plant and CCS system mean that it could be done much more cheaply next time. But construction cost is not the only problem with the plant.

The refurbished and retrofitted Unit #3 is also much less efficient than its predecessor. It will supply "over 110 megawatts" of electricity to the grid compared with 139 MW previously, a reduction of around 20 percent, according to SaskPower.

The reduction in net output is in line with published estimates for the "energy penalty" imposed by CCS systems, which is the major barrier to their widespread adoption.

PRICE TO PAY

Separating CO2 from the other gases in the plant’s exhaust stream (mainly nitrogen and water vapour), compressing it, transporting it by pipeline and injecting it deep underground under high pressure all need a substantial amount of work and consume a significant amount of the heat and electrical output from the power plant.

Published estimates for the size of this "energy penalty" at a typical power plant vary. Researchers at Britain’s Imperial College put it at around 20 percent ("Carbon capture technology: future fossil fuel use and mitigating climate change" Nov 2010).

But scientists at Harvard and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) suggested the penalty could range anywhere from a theoretical lower bound of 11 percent to as much as 40 percent, with 29 percent as a good target ("The energy penalty of post-combustion CO2 capture and storage" Jan 2009).

The penalty must be paid by burning more fuel or reducing the net amount of electricity supplied. In Unit #3’s case, the project planners opted for lower net electrical output.

Net output from Unit #3 has fallen around 20 percent, but the upgrade is likely to have involved an improved steam generator and turbines, which would otherwise have increased output.

The underlying energy penalty probably falls within the 20-30 percent range, in line with the central estimates produced by most researchers.

POLICY SUPPORT

The most modern ultra-supercritical coal power plants can achieve a thermal efficiency of up to about 45 percent.

Retrofitting an ultra-supercritical power plant would reduce its thermal efficiency to around 35 percent, a penalty of around 25 percent.

But for less-efficient supercritical and sub-critical power plants, with initial thermal efficiencies of less than 40 percent and in some cases less than 30 percent, the penalty could amount to 40 percent or even 50 percent of the plant’s total electrical output.

Even a 20-30 percent energy penalty is enormous and would radically affect the operations of coal-fired power plants in North America and the rest of the world if all power plants were retrofitted with CCS systems.

Retrofitting all coal-fired plants in the United States would increase coal consumption by 400-600 million tonnes per year, or cut their net electrical output by 75-100 gigawatts, more than the peak demand of California, according to the Harvard and MIT researchers.

In practice, it would not be cost-effective to retrofit the entire fleet. It would make more sense to retrofit only the most modern and efficient plants, retire older ones and replace them with new capacity.

Given the enormous practical impact of the energy penalty, there is intense interest in finding ways to reduce it.

Most of the energy consumed in the CCS process is used in capturing and compressing CO2 in the first place.

Researchers are trying to find ways to separate CO2 more efficiently from the other gases in the exhaust stream and run the compression system using some of the heat that would otherwise be wasted from the power plant.

But even with those measures, CCS will only be competitive if the energy penalty is offset by carbon taxes, carbon prices, or other policy measures to level the playing field by pushing up the cost of electricity from other fossil fuel plants.

So in the longer term, the outlook for CCS is really a gamble on the outlook for carbon prices, taxes and tough emission controls, rather than a technology problem.

http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/10/06/carboncapture-economics-kemp-idUSL6N0S12GI20141006?feedType=RSS&feedName=everything&virtualBrandChannel=11563

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